Governing local security in the eastern Congo Decentralization, police reform and interventions in the chieftaincy of Buhavu

MICHEL THILL AND ABEL CIMANUKA

Rift Valley Institute
Taasisi ya Bonde Kuu
معهد الأخدود العظيم
Machadka Dooxada Rift
Instituto do Vale do Rift
Institut de la Vallée du Rift
www.riftvalley.net

VNG
International

Acknowledgements

· ·

Cover image: A suggestion box at a police station encouraging civilians to engage the police on matters of local security. Installed on the police's own initiative, so far the box remains heavily underused. Minova, DRC, July 2019 © Michel Thill

Michel Thill is a Doctoral Research Fellow with the Conflict Research Group (CRG) at Ghent University. His PhD research explores police practices and the daily negotiation of public order in Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Michel is an associate of the Bukavu-based Groupe d'Etudes sur les Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine (GEC-SH) and a Fellow of RVI, whose Great Lakes programme he was responsible for from 2012 to 2016.

Abel Cimanuka Kajuci, lawyer by training, is the Executive Secretary of the Conseil Local pour la Sécurité de Proximité (CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security) of the municipality of Ibanda in the city of Bukavu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is an expert and independent consultant in the field of security sector reform and in particular in police reform, civil engagement and human security.

The Rift Valley Institute works in eastern and central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.

· ·

Table of Contents

Kalehe, Buhavu and Buzi in South Kivu, eastern DRC

Legend:
- International boundary
- KIVU — Province
- KALEHE — Territoire
- BUHAVU — Chefferie
- Buzi — Groupement
- *Cinq collines*, contested between Ziralo and Buzi
- National Park
- Provincial capital
- Chef-lieu of territoire
- Other town

Labels on map: Virunga NP, NORTH KIVU, MASISI, Bulenga, Goma, Minova, Kasunyu, Ngandjo, Luzirandaka, Kalungu, Buzi, Bululu, Lumbishi, Lowa, Shanje, Numbi, Lake Kivu, Tushanguti, Chambombo, Ziralo, Mbinga Nord, Mukwindja, WALIKALE, Mubuku, Nyabibwe, SOUTH KIVU, BUHAVU, Luhoho, Mbinga-Sud, Bugarula, Kalehe, IDJWI, Luka, Kalima, BULOHO, KALEHE, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, Kalonge, KABARE, Kabare, Bukavu, Ruzizi, WALUNGU, 15 km

Inset map: UGANDA, Kalehe, RWANDA, DRC, BURUNDI, TANZANIA

Base map data source: OpenStreetMap

MAP*grafix* 2019

Summary

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or Congo), security governance is competitive, fragmented and marked by violence. Multiple actors—state and non-state—vie for influence and many areas of the country lack effective structures to ensure that their residents live in safety and security. In this context, the threat and use of violence has become central to the state's efforts to maintain social control and public order. This tendency has come to shape the troubled relationship between Congolese citizens and the army and police, reflected in numerous fraught day-to-day interactions. Two ongoing processes—administrative decentralization and police reform—have been designed to turn a page on past practices, bring government and security closer to the population and, consequently, improve this relationship. While they have had some successes, they also risk the re-creation of existing governance dynamics within newly empowered local administrative and security-related entities.

Decentralization and police reform

Decentralization is intended to bring government closer to its citizens, making it more responsive and improving public services. However, instead of becoming more accountable and increasing service provision, chiefs of newly decentralized administrative entities have begun to mimic long-standing state practices of resource extraction from the population, while providing only limited and irregular public services in return.

Police reform aims to establish an apolitical and preventive police service that works closely with communities and is thus able to respond to their security needs. But this model also risks disrupting past security governance practices. A police force that works for citizens and does not extract resources from them threatens revenue streams, which help maintain the current structure of elite power. Preventive and democratic policing principles also inhibit the use of repressive force necessary to maintain and secure the regime.

Both decentralization and police reform constitute a major break from past structures of governance, which generally did not work to serve the population, but rather to protect the interests of those in power. Instead of replacing these abusive structures, these two processes have added new layers of complexity to security governance. Moreover, they have not been adequately resourced to make them effective.

Introducing the CLSP

Despite these fundamental challenges, police reform has had some successes. The most significant of these is the establishment of the *Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité*

(CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security), which was anchored in Congolese law through a decree passed in 2013.

The CLSP is a coordination platform dedicated to human security which brings together representatives from the administration, police, justice and civil society to find joint and sustainable responses to problems of local security at the level of the *entités territoriales décentralisées* (ETD, decentralized territorial entities). CLSPs draw on information provided by the *Forums de quartier* (FQ, Neighbourhood Forums) in cities and *Forums de groupement* (FG, Grouping Forums) in rural areas, to compose local security diagnostics and plans.

As part of the police reform process, CLSPs were set up and tested in three pilot cities across the country: Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu. Their relative success in improving police–community relations encouraged reformers to establish them in rural areas. However, the donor withdrew their support in 2014, which has considerably slowed down the expansion of CLSPs in rural areas.

In 2019, the new national government pledged to reinvigorate police reform. The new provincial government in South Kivu also called for the establishment of CLSPs across the province, thus announcing a potentially profound intervention in prevailing and often precarious local security governance arrangements.

The chieftaincy of Buhavu in Kalehe territory in South Kivu offers valuable insights into the introduction of CLSPs in the rural DRC. There are, however, a number of significant challenges, which range from a scarcity of resources, to the area's particularly complex security environment. This includes multiple armed groups, conflicts among communities and in civil society organizations, and competition for security responsibilities between centralized and decentralized administrators.

In the absence of a coherent security strategy, local communities, leaders, authorities, and state and non-state security actors have little choice but to seek practical arrangements and compromises to cope with insecurity. The necessary, and constant, process of communication and exchange—keeping all actors engaged and cooperating in this over-crowded space—shows how authorities and communities attempt to govern security in practice.

These practices of engagement, communication and inclusion at the village level also capture the spirit of the CLSP, which the police reform process aims to establish at ETD levels. Local governance practices may thus serve to inspire and empower higher-level administrators in establishing CLSPs and move towards formalizing security governance in their entities.

Intervening in local security governance

Outside interventions in security governance face steep challenges. Nevertheless, the CLSP remains a promising development in government efforts to bring state security actors and

communities closer together. It thus merits outside support. Previous interventions could, however, draw more lessons from the cities where police reform was piloted and where the CLSP and the FQs continue to function, if irregularly.

The purpose of the CLSP is often misunderstood by outsiders. Moreover, the CLSP is sometimes confused in form and aim with the *Conseil local de sécurité* (CLS, Local Security Council), a council of state security actors situated at all administrative levels. The CLS is not anchored in Congolese law but is based on long-standing practice. It takes operational decisions and is closed to the public.

Attempts by outsiders to organize and mobilize communities for the sake of better cooperation with state security actors risk creating parallel structures of civil society, which only increases fragmentation instead of leading to meaningful grassroots involvement.

To improve local security governance in the DRC, those working on and intervening in it should consider the following:

1. **Thinking human security**—placing it at the forefront of security-related planning—ought to precede all other efforts. The sooner security governance actors start to do so, the more likely their proposals and actions will be aligned with the principle of putting the security needs of the population at the heart of their initiatives.

2. **Engaging meaningfully with the police** is a prerequisite for any outside intervention into local security governance. After all, the CLSP is a direct result of police reform and functions as the key instrument in improving police–community relations. To ensure police buy-in, interventions could provide human rights and basic legal training, support logistics and facilitate joint police–community activities.

3. **To maximize the potential of the CLSP decree**, all security governance actors first need to fully appreciate its main purpose—inclusion and regular exchange—and the flexibility of its legal framework, which allows its structures to be shaped to local realities and exigencies. For outside interveners, it is also important to invest sufficient resources, time and energy to prepare the ground on which to establish the CLSP and to implicate and learn from specialists involved in urban police reform and its successes.

4. **Budgeting for security** can be accomplished by drawing on and reorganizing existing funds at the disposal of chiefs of decentralized entities. Lobbying the participatory budget, a well-functioning donor-supported initiative, to finance projects with a direct relevance to local security is also worth pursuing.

5. **Mobilizing chieftaincies** to take up their responsibilities in the realm of security is ultimately the most important, yet also most difficult task. Outside interveners could draw on peer-pressure from those chiefs in the Congo and elsewhere who lead by example in order to encourage others. Accompanying both decentralized chieftaincies and centralized administrations in improving their work relations could also go a long way in ensuring a more efficient provision of security to the Congo's communities.

1. Introduction

In June 2019, the newly elected governor of South Kivu, Théo Ngwabije Kasi, announced his aim to make operational the *Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité* (CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security).[1] The CLSP, anchored in law in 2013, works to find sustainable responses to problems of insecurity at the local level. Two months later, the national government announced its intention to revisit the continued reform of the *Police Nationale Congolaise* (PNC, Congolese National Police), draft a new reference plan for the reform, provide for a 'consequential' budget to go along with it, build additional police stations and establish a *Police de proximité* (proximity police) across the country.[2] After years of slow progress, police reform has been reaffirmed as a priority of the government agenda both at national and provincial levels.

The CLSP is a result of the continued reform of the PNC. It is a security coordination platform bringing together representatives from the administration, police, judiciary and civil society, who jointly elaborate plans addressing issues of local security and public order at the level of the recently decentralized urban *communes* (municipalities), the rural *secteurs* (sectors) and *chefferies* (chieftaincies).[3] From 2012 onwards, CLSPs were set up in three pilot cities across the country: Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu. Their relative success in improving police–community relations in the pilot cities encouraged reformers to institute CLSPs in rural areas. Donor funding was withdrawn in 2014, however, which has not only slowed down the expansion of the CLSPs, but efforts at police reform more generally.

In the context of the new government's intention to revitalize police reform, it is important to understand the potential challenges associated with introducing CLSPs in rural areas. The vast majority of *entités territoriales décentralisées* (ETDs, decentralized territorial entities) are rural entities, which are markedly different from their urban counterparts. Installing CLSPs also means disrupting prevailing security governance arrangements, which may trigger local resistance.

There are several challenges that may affect the applicability of the CLSP decree in rural areas. This report, based on research carried out in the chieftaincy of Buhavu in Kalehe

1 Prime Minister's Office, 'Décret Nr. 13/041 du 16 septembre 2013 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement des Conseils Locaux pour la Sécurité de Proximité', Kinshasa: Prime Minister's Office, 2013 (on file with author).

2 Prime Minister's Office, 'Programme du Gouvernement', Kinshasa: Prime Minister's Office, August 2019, 6–7 (on file with author).

3 Provincial Governor's Office (South Kivu), 'Discours-Programme du Gouvernement Provincial prononcé par Son Excellence Monsieur Théo Ngwabidje Kasi, Gouverneur de Province, à l'Assemblée Provinciale du Sud-Kivu', Bukavu, 11 June 2019 (on file with author).

territory in South Kivu,[4] outlines what these challenges are and situates them in a larger analytical framework of security governance. While the application of the CLSP decree in rural areas faces challenges, which may not consistently allow for its strict enactment, none of these should constitute an obstacle to the unfolding of the decree in spirit; namely, the desire for regular and inclusive communication among all relevant security actors in a given administrative entity.

At the lowest administrative level, administrators, communities and armed actors who confront the most testing conditions do come together from time to time to carve out security arrangements (often somewhat precarious in nature) in an effort to facilitate coexistence. Observing these practices may inspire higher-level administrators at the ETD, territorial and provincial level to resist the tendency to present the difficulties in implementing the CLSP in rural areas as an excuse to remain inactive, but to instead use it as a tool of empowerment and take action in matters of local security.

4 The research commissioned by Dutch organization VNG International as part of their ongoing work on increasing mutual accountability between local government and communities in Kalehe, took place in July 2019. The researchers conducted 27 interviews and one focus group, speaking to a total of 34 persons including policemen, state attorneys, state administrators, army officers, civil society representatives and NGO staff.

2. A history of security governance in the Congo

Security governance is directly linked to questions of territorial and public administration. A hallmark in the history of security governance in the Congo has been a tension between extraction and the self-enrichment of those in power, the desire to control populations as much as possible and the cost of maintaining a security apparatus capable of doing so. This tension has directly impacted the security practices of the police and army, which in turn have shaped the troubled relationship between them and civilians at large.

The Congo Free State (1885–1908)

There are many different ways to govern people and territory. In the precolonial Congo, the larger, more centralized empires and kingdoms of the Kongo, Luba and Lunda had relative control over the core of their territories, while opting to govern their peripheries through a combination of alliances and military raids. They considered the cost of establishing an effective and direct administration in these borderlands as simply too high a price to pay for the expected return. Others tried and failed, and still others imposed a system of indirect rule. In precolonial Kalehe, a variety of political entities existed in close proximity. To the west and closer to the Congo basin, the Tembo and Nyanga lived in small, tightly knit communities. The Havu who called the shores of Lake Kivu home, had a more centralized polity. Regardless of political organization, however, the people of this region were all highly mobile and interconnected, trading goods and exchanging ideas.[5]

Once Belgian King Leopold II had successfully managed to claim the Congo basin as his, naming it the Congo Free State (1885–1908), he was determined for his colony to pay its own way via local taxation. This imperative shaped the way he governed the territory: Through a regime of merciless extraction. The Congo Free State established and kept the control necessary for efficient exploitation through the combination of three approaches. First, it had a relatively small armed force, the *Force publique* (FP, Public Force), which functioned as both police and army. Second, it maintained a network of fragile and ever-changing pacts with local chiefs and leaders, and their auxiliary troops. Third, it gave considerable liberties to private conglomerates in securing their concessions through their own sentries. The limited financial means at the disposal of administrators had a direct impact on how the FP and its local and private allies went about their work. That is, the troops 'were plunder machines as well as conquering armies: not or inadequately provisioned they largely lived off the land, raiding for food, slaves and war booty wherever they passed'.[6]

---

5 Jan Vansina, 'A Comparison of African Kingdoms', Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 32/4 (1962).

6 Aldwin Roes, 'Towards a History of Mass Violence in the Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885–1908', South African Historical Journal 62/4 (2010): 637.

In the easternmost parts of the Congo Free State, the FP fought a war with its declared enemy, the Sultanate of Zanzibar and its slave traders, who had established trading posts along the Congo River well before the creation of the Congo Free State. War required food and porters, which the soldiers either simply raided from nearby peoples or which local chiefs were forced to provide at the displeasure of their communities. This violent security machinery, made up of a mosaic of armed state and non-state security actors, lacked effective central control; rather, its governance was as dispersed as the mosaic was fragmented.[7]

The colonial state only unfolded its full might in its eastern regions in the years following the end of Leopold's Congo Free State. Indeed, only in 1911 did colonial agents demarcate the most eastern borders, paving the way for the Belgian Congo to extend its grasp to the shores of Lake Kivu.[8]

The Belgian Congo (1908–1960)

While the most excessive forms of plunder, atrocities and mass violence subsided after the Belgian annexation of the Congo Free State in 1908, much of its violent and exploitative culture of governance remained in place, along with the coercive practices associated with it. Emphasizing continuities rather than discontinuities, one observer notes that 'as a colony, the Belgian Congo was strongly marked by the Leopoldian legacy as a system of economic exploitation, political repression and cultural oppression'.[9] Forced labour practices continued and, during the Second World War with its enormous demands for labour, reached levels of coercion not dissimilar to those under Leopold. In terms of public and territorial administration, the Belgian colonial administration progressively intensified its penetration of the Congo to an extent not seen in most other African colonies. Over several decades of colonial rule, traditional Congolese political structures were reorganized, regrouped, abolished or invented to fit a highly centralized, unitary and symmetric Napoleonic logic of administration. At its most local level, the colonial state eventually established a system of indirect rule in which it relied on allied chiefs and local leaders to keep order over and tax the local population on their behalf.[10]

7 Kasper Hoffmann, Koen Vlassenroot and Gauthier Marchais, 'Taxation, stateness and armed groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction in Eastern Congo', Development and Change 47/6 (2016): 1437–1438.

8 Gillian Mathys, 'People on the move: Frontiers, borders, mobility and history in the Lake Kivu region, 19th to 20th century', PhD thesis, Ghent University, Ghent, 2014: 130–136.

9 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila. A People's History. London: Zed Books, 2002: 26. Also see: Benoit Henriet, 'Ordering the Wetlands: Policing and Legitimate Violence in the Leverville Concession (Belgian Congo, 1911–1920)', in Policing in Colonial Empires: Cases, Connections, Boundaries (ca. 1850–1970), eds. Emmanuel Blanchard, Marieke Bloembergen and Amandine Lauro, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2017.

10 Mahmood Mamdani, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis', Social Text 60 (1999): 53–62.

In Kalehe, Havu chiefs from the more centralized political entities played along with colonial agents to secure themselves privileged positions in the emerging colonial admin-istration, while communities to the west such as the Tembo showed fierce resistance and faced military occupation as a consequence. Once chieftaincies were regrouped and fully incorporated into the colonial state, colonial agents created a large Buhavu chiefdom at the expense of the neighbouring Tembo and other ethnic communities, which now saw themselves ruled by Havu. This created tension, which remains of utmost importance in the ongoing and partly violent conflicts and politics in Kalehe up to the present.[11]

Despite colonial penetration, the sheer size of the administrative entities still made it difficult to govern effectively. In the prefectural system of the colonial state, territorial administrators single-handedly carried the responsibility to project and enact its might. Facing the impossible task of being everywhere at once, fearing upheavals and revolts, and reassured by feeble oversight mechanisms to prevent the excessive use of violence, territorial administrators all too often fell back on coercion to ensure control. To facilitate their task, the colonial state markedly centralized its security apparatus. The FP turned into the most effective colonial army on the African continent, and, in the final decades of the colony, police forces became common features in urban centres, while the colo-nial intelligence agency or political police, the *Sûreté,* gained a fearsome reputation. That security forces were regularly used to mobilize labour and round up taxes, enforce racial segregation and suppress political movements and aspirations merely reaffirmed the inte-gral role violence continued to play in security governance.

The Mobutist state (1965–1997)

During the immediate post-independence years (1960–1965), the Congo decentralized into a federal state with a substantial degree of power located at the provincial level, including in matters of security. These years were marked by political fragmentation, secession, turmoil and civil war fuelled by Cold War politics. President Mobutu Sese Seko, who seized power in a coup in 1965, did not waste time recentralizing the state and its coercive arm in order to consolidate his rule. To a large extent, Mobutu's efforts at state formation returned Zaire (as the DRC was called from 1971–1997) to the structure and spirit of the colonial state.[12] The emerging system of patronage and competition over resources, however, slowly eroded state capacity, rendering it 'corrupt and inefficient', as Mobutu himself admitted.[13] This had tremendous consequences for the everyday lives of

11 Hoffmann et al., 'Taxation, stateness and armed groups'.

12 Thomas M Callaghy, The State–Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 227.

13 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, 221.

Congolese citizens. Insecurity and scarcity became 'the motoring forces behind a dialectic of oppression'.[14]

From 1966 onward, Mobutu reduced the 21 provinces of the First Republic to 8. He also depoliticized them by turning them into purely administrative units, eventually renamed as regions. Regional commissioners were directly appointed by the president and entirely depended on him. Under the logic of unity of command, which held together the highly centralized but deconcentrated state, these all-powerful prefects enjoyed much discretion. They commanded over all ministries, administrations and services within their entities, including those of the security forces. At the same time, they were responsible for all matters of public and political life, from taxation to law and order, and from education and health to infrastructure, thus facing similarly challenging tasks as their colonial predecessors.

To address these governance challenges, regional commissioners and their security forces relied on the central government to send them their *frais de fonctionnement* (operational costs). From the mid-1970s onward, however, rapid economic decline meant that the central government sent such operational costs on an increasingly irregular basis. Commissioners and their agents were thus forced to improvise. This practice became known as '*Système D*', derived from the popular phrase '*débrouillez-vous*' (fend for yourselves), or Article 15, after an imaginary article in the 1960 constitution of secessionist South Kasai that encouraged its officials to improvise in times of need. 'Governance with empty pockets' includes subsidizing services from one's own pocket, charging for them, inventing fees, embezzling state property or asking for bribes.[15] For the security services, the use of violence is an additional option.

While these revenue generating practices have guaranteed the survival of the state and its employees, they weigh heavily on Congolese citizens and their livelihoods. Further worsening these tendencies is the logic of patronage through which Mobutu governed and which has come to permeate all state institutions. State officials double as patrons: They use their position to provide clients direct favours and services or to grant them access to revenue generating opportunities in return for loyalty. Some rank and file police, for example, have to pay daily or weekly fees to their superiors known as *rapportage* (reporting) which they are often only able to do by harassing civilians. Those who do not comply can be rotated to less lucrative posts, thrown into jail or dismissed from service.[16] As a result of Article 15 and patronage, security institutions have turned into rent producing structures over which elites engage in fierce competition and where positions and public resources are used for political and private purposes.

14 Michael G Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988, 3.

15 Tom De Herdt and Kristof Titeca, 'Governance with Empty Pockets: The Education Sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo', Development and Change 47/3 (2016): 472–494

16 Michel Thill, 'Police at Work in Bukavu: Negotiating Revenue-generation in Urban Pirate Markets', in Negotiating Public Services in the Congo: State, Society and Governance, eds. Tom De Herdt and Kristof Titeca, London: Zed Books, 2019.

Perhaps because of these dynamics, Mobutu never quite managed to fully extend his grip over the security forces. Parallel units and chains of command competed with one another and weakened their efficacy; and their pauperization from the 1970s onward led to widespread harassment and abuse of civilians.[17] Compared to the Belgian Congo, the nature of Mobutist state violence had changed. The tenuous control over police and army, the scarcity that marked their livelihoods and a permissive climate 'meant that brutality was less focused' and 'the use of violence was more capricious and random'.[18] Regardless of its nature, however, force and coercion persisted in the everyday lives of the Congolese. They had 'lost none of their vitality; indeed … the ever-present threat of repressive action is indispensable to sustain not just the state's hegemony, but its survival'.[19]

Mobutu's drive for centralization halted at the lower levels of administration. His attempts to integrate collectivities—sectors and chieftaincies—and the villages below these into his prefectural system of governance largely failed due to a combination of lack of state capacity and competence, and the resistance of the chiefs and peoples in question. These local chiefs thus retained a fair amount of autonomy in governing their own entities, including in matters of justice and security. Nevertheless, the Mobutist state national-ization of all land in the 1970s put customary chiefs in the midst of a growing crisis of public authority. Many used the nationalization process to sell off their customary lands to Congolese elites, leaving their own communities bereft of their livelihoods. Not only did this erode public trust in chiefs, it also led to a stark increase in competition over resources. In Kalehe, this competition gained ethnic undertones and laid fertile ground for armed mobilization in the years to come.[20]

The Congo Wars and their aftermath (1996–present)

In the late 1990s, the start of the Congo wars (1996–2003) and the fall of Mobutu led to a further fragmentation of the security landscape in the country. In the eastern DRC, with rapidly growing insecurity and in the absence of police, this period saw the rise of new local security actors, such as the *nyumba kumi* (ten houses). These and other low-level urban and rural administrators played an important role in monitoring the movement of visitors and the presence of foreigners, in mobilizing youth to patrol the streets at night

17 Thierry Mayamba Nlandu, 'Mapping Police Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Institutional Interactions at Central, Provincial and Local Levels', IDS Research Report 71, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2012; Kaumba Lufunda, 'La formation d'une armée républicaine et d'une police nationale: situation et perspectives', Congo–Afrique 470 (2012): 726–751. An important exception to this is the Centre National de Documentation (National Centre for Documentation), successor of the Sûreté. See Schatzberg, Dialectics of Oppression, 38–51.

18 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 261.

19 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 244.

20 Hoffmann et al., 'Taxation, stateness and armed groups'; Catherine Newbury, 'Ebutumwa Bw'emiogo: The Tyranny of Cassava. A Women's Tax Revolt in Eastern Zaire', Canadian Journal of African Studies 18/1 (1984): 35–54.

and in improvising neighbourhood alarm systems when necessary.[21] While their involvement was born out of necessity, it also effectively decentralized security governance and introduced new practices, interests and agendas.

During the transition to peace (2003–2006), several ambitious restructuring and reform processes were launched and continue in 2019, including that of the security forces. In practice, however, these reforms clash not only with the logic of patronage, which continues to permeate Congolese state institutions, but also with the purpose of the Congolese state, which has, since independence, functioned as a source of enrichment and protection for elites. Moreover, in the eastern parts of the country conflict has continued, despite repetitive demobilization and reintegration processes. The political manipulation of armed groups and the democratization of militarized politics play an important part in continued violence and have led to the proliferation of armed groups. In 2019, the territory of Kalehe alone is home to between 10 and 25 armed groups. Arguably, security governance in the Congo is more fragmented than ever, while the formation of an apolitical democratic security service very much remains a work in progress.[22]

21 For an insight into the urban dimension of these dynamics, see: Judith Verweijen, 'Violent Cities, Violent Society: Analyzing urban violence in the eastern Congo', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2019; Karen Büscher, 'Conflict, state failure and urban transformation in the Eastern Congolese periphery', PhD thesis, Ghent University, Ghent, 2011.

22 Judith Verweijen, 'Stable Instability: Political settlements and armed groups in the Congo', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016; Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma, 'Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2015; Christoph Vogel and Josaphat Musamba. 'Recycling Rebels? Demobilization in the Congo', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016.

3. Decentralization and police reform in the Congo

The 2006 Congolese constitution lays the groundwork for several major reforms. This includes the reform of territorial administration through renewed decentralization efforts and police reform. In relation to the latter, the intention is to transform the police into an apolitical service working for and with the population, inspired by a philosophy of *Police de proximité* (proximity police, a policing model similar to community policing).[23] The context for implementing these reforms is anything but straightforward. Especially in the eastern Congo, where a myriad of armed groups continue to engage in small-scale violent conflict with one another and against the army, security governance has become a challenge that is beyond the grasp of the state alone. To maintain a measure of control, its security services enter into fluid alliances with non-state security actors; for example, armed groups in rural areas or youth gangs in cities.

Decentralization and police reform have proceeded, further loosening the already precarious central state hold over the security apparatus. The ambition of these reforms is to mark a clear departure from past governance practices and announce the beginning of a new era. Ultimately, however, their partial, underfunded and often inconsequential implementation have only further complicated security governance in the Congo.

Creating new layers of extraction and control

As in any other process of devolution, decentralization aims to bring the Congolese government closer to its citizens, making it more responsive and improving public services. Decentralization has increased the number of provinces from 11 to 26; given more political, administrative, legal, economic and financial autonomy to provinces; and conferred the status of ETDs to cities and their immediate sub-entities (municipalities), as well as to sectors and chieftaincies (sub-entities of territories).[24] While not always the case in practice, according to law, provincial governors and ETD chiefs are no longer nominated by the central government but are indirectly and directly elected in provincial, local and municipal elections. Provinces and ETDs also enjoy a degree of decision-making power in education, health and infrastructure. Security is a responsibility shared with central government at the provincial level, while ETD chiefs have a duty to maintain public order,

23 Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo', Articles 182–186, 47th year, special number, 18 February 2006.

24 The urban administrative entities below the municipality, districts and avenue level remain decentralized and cannot levy taxes. Their functioning is financially dependent on the central administration budget. See: Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Loi organique n° 10/11 du 18 mai 2010 portant fixation des subdivisions territoriales à l'intérieur des provinces', Articles 35–37, Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la République, 7 June 2010.

which gives them a say over local police.[25] To fund these competencies, both provinces and ETDs can impose and collect a range of taxes in their entities. Moreover, provinces have the right to retain 40 per cent of their total tax revenue, 40 per cent of which they retrocede to ETDs.[26] On paper, the decentralization process thus marks a major breaking point with colonial and Mobutist centralized modes of governance. To overcome long-established practices and habits of prefectural rule is, however, more easily said than done.

Ever since its start in 2006, the process of decentralization has been accompanied by a persistent lack of planning and funding. Local and municipal elections have not yet been held. In their absence, ETD chiefs continue to be appointed by central government, calling into question their legitimacy and accountability for those they govern.[27] A worrying lack of administrative capacity also remains at the local level. While central and provincial governments have set up divisions to strengthen that capacity, as well as to accompany and advise ETDs in the process of decentralization, these divisions likewise suffer from a lack of funding. Moreover, much of their time is spent trying to align donor programmes with central government strategy, and to reconcile the competing agendas of provincial ministries and government.[28]

Decentralization has disrupted existing governance structures in two important ways. First, a weak central state has been reproduced at the local level as ETDs are neither receiving nor raising sufficient means to provide better public services. At the same time, ETDs have enough autonomy to mimic the predatory practices of central government to find ways to live off the local population.[29] The Congo has a long history of such *débrouil-*

25 They can, for example, call for extraordinary missions such as in case of demonstrations, strikes and riots. See: President's Office, 'Loi organique nr. 11/013 du 11 août portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Police Nationale Congolaise', Article 17, Kinshasa, 2011 (on file with author); Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Loi organique n° 08/016 du 7 octobre 2008 portant composition, organisation et fonctionnement des Entités Décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l'État et les Provinces', Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la République, 10 October 2008.

26 Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Constitution'; Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Loi des Entités Décentralisées'; Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Loi subdivisions territoriales'; Cellule Technique d'Appui à la Décentralisation, 'La décentralisation en bref', 2013; Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, 'Loi n° 11/011 du 13 juillet 2011 relative aux finances publiques', 52nd year, special number, 25 July 2011.

27 Joseph Hengelela Cihunda, 'Decentralised Territorial Entities and Promotion of Local Governance under the Constitution of 18 February 2006 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', in Decentralisation and Constitutionalism in Africa, eds. Charles M. Fombad and Nico Steytler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 365–383.

28 Interview with agent of South Kivu provincial division of decentralization, Bukavu, 3 July 2019.

29 Pierre Englebert, 'Incertitude, autonomie et parasitisme: Les Entités Territoriales Décentralisées et l'État en République démocratique du Congo', Politique Africaine 125 (2012): 169–187; Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, 'Misguided and Misdiagnosed: The Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Congo', African Studies Review 59/1 (2016): 5–32.

lardise (improvisation): State officials making do with whatever is thrown at them.[30] The process of decentralization is no exception. To some extent, local administrators have subverted the opportunities provided by decentralization for their own purposes. Second, the half-hearted implementation of decentralization has further complicated local security governance. Some army and police officers seem reluctant to accept that lower-ranked administrators, such as sub-mayors, and the sector and chieftaincy chiefs, have a say in the maintenance of public order in their jurisdictions and can therefore call on them.[31] Inversely, some ETD chiefs, in particular customary chiefs, struggle to impose their newly acquired authority over state security forces.

In sum, in an attempt to bring government closer to its citizens, decentralization has turned the newly formed decentralized entities into additional sources of extraction without providing any meaningful public services in return. Patronage and state security governance have also been further fragmented and dispersed. In theory, police reform not only relies on these entities but similarly aims to bring the police closer to its citizens. Therefore, police reform and restructuring should shake up existing security governance logics and arrangements even further.

Reforming the police

Since the 1990s, based on the assumption that good police–community relations reinforce state legitimacy, community-oriented police reform has risen to become a central element in security sector reform and statebuilding.[32] Implementing community policing models in conflict-affected and patronage-based states is beset by significant challenges. In the Congo, similar to decentralization, police reform threatens to disrupt existing security governance in two fundamental ways. First, patronage structures—which incentivize revenue generation and the cultivation of personal loyalties—hamper the progress of community policing models. Police working for citizens instead of using them to extract resources threatens the flow of funds that keeps current police and government elites in power. Second, democratic and preventative policing principles are at odds with the repressive force needed to maintain regime security. This tension reflects a wider, global problem with security sector reform: All too often, it threatens the very foundations of

30 This is derived from the meanings of (imaginary) Article 15 and the phrase *débrouillez-vous* (fend for yourself).

31 Nlandu, 'Mapping Police Services', 80.

32 Nematullah Bizhan, 'Building legitimacy and state capacity in protracted fragility: The case of Afghanistan', London and Oxford: Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018. Accessed 10 October 2018, https://www.theigc.org/publication/building-legitimacy-state-capacity-protracted-fragility-case-afghanistan; Allegra Clare Schermuly, 'Encounters between the police and the public: seize the day or practice avoidance?', Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice 4/2 (2018): 148–160; Philipp Rotmann, 'First steps towards a police doctrine for UN peace operations (2001–2006)', Policing and Society 21/1 (2011): 84–95; Nadine Ansorg, Felix Haass and Julia Strasheim, 'Police reforms in peace agreements, 1975–2011: Introducing the PRPA dataset', Journal of Peace Research 53/4 (2016): 597–607; Beth K. Greener, 'UNPOL: UN police as peacekeepers', Policing & Society 19 (2009): 109–118.

power of those responsible for implementing the reforms.[33] Nonetheless, police reform in the Congo has had some successes.

Continued police reform aims to turn the Congolese police force into a *Police de proximité* based on a philosophy and working strategy that emphasizes police–community partnership, accountability and preventative policing. From 2009 to its premature end in 2015, an ambitious donor programme in support of police reform, the GBP 60 million (USD 87 million) Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) programme funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), started implementing this vision in three pilot site cities: Matadi, Kananga and Bukavu. The SSAPR took a two-pronged approach, focusing both on the supply and demand sides of reform. It promoted institutional reform and capacity building at the highest level and simultaneously carried out large popular sensitization campaigns and established meeting and coordination platforms between police, urban administrations and communities—the *Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité* (CLSP, Local Council for Proximity Security) and *Forums de quartier* (FQ, Neighbourhood Forums).[34]

The CLSPs and FQs exist next to a much longer-standing security council, the *Conseil local de sécurité* (CLS, local security council). The CLS is not anchored in law. Rather, common practice since at least Mobutu has institutionalized it over time and made it the most important meeting platform for state security governance. The council tends to meet every two weeks. It can be called in at every administrative level—from the province down to the *groupement.* The council brings together all key security actors (army, police, intelligence and migration services) and is presided over by the relevant administrative authority. In contrast to the CLSP's active engagement of civil society and a more human security oriented approach, the CLS deals with questions of state security and makes operational and intelligence decisions, which is why it is closed to the public. Since at least the 1990s, however, under pressure from an increasingly strong civil society in the years following the end of Mobutu's one-party rule, some CLS meetings have consulted its representatives before taking decisions on matters of state security. Such largely ad hoc meetings are known as CLS *élargi* (CLSe, extended CLS). Importantly, the CLSe is a merely consultative meeting and, as with the CLS, is not rooted in law.[35]

On paper, the CLS, CLSe, CLSP, FQ and FG complement one another. The CLS deals with questions of state security and uses the CLSe to consult civilians, as well as to convey its decisions and operations to them. The CLSP, FQ and FG focus on human security and make community representatives equal partners in providing inclusive responses to local

33 Michel Thill, Robert Njangala and Josaphat Musamba, 'Putting everyday police life at the centre of reform', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2018.

34 Interviews with senior SSAPR staff, Brussels, 18 March and 8 June 2016; Kinshasa, 13 and 14 September 2016; Bukavu, 22 October 2016. Also see: Palladium, 'Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report', London: Palladium, 2015.

35 'Guide Pratique: Les Comités Provinciaux et locaux de sécurité et les Forums de Quartier', Kinshasa, 27 February 2012 (on file with author).

security concerns. SSAPR did manage to get them to work alongside one another and any other outside security governance interventions must familiarize themselves and their beneficiaries with these various platforms to avoid competition in purpose and over limited funds.

Box 1: The CLSP and FQ: Success in the city

In order to create a framework for police–community encounters, police reform established two meeting platforms, the CLSP and the FQ. The CLSP sits at the level of ETDs (sectors, chieftaincies and municipalities but not cities). The CLSP aims to create a framework for regular dialogue between public actors and civil society to exchange information and experience on matters of human security or proximity security (Art. 1 and 2 of the 2012 CLSP decree). The CLSP meets every trimester to prepare security diagnoses for its entity, develop a *Plan local de sécurité* (PLS, Local Security Plan) and decide on initiatives to prevent or address local security risks. Such local security projects can use the ETD budget to take direct action on matters of local security. In 2013, the CLSP was anchored in law through a prime ministerial decree, which is one of the central achievements of the SSAPR. Importantly, the decree explicitly provides for the enactment of a provincial CLSP fund, to which donors and international NGOs can directly contribute to support CLSP activities.

The backbone of the CLSP are the FQs in cities and the *Forums de groupement* (FG, Grouping Forums) in rural areas. These monthly forums sit at the administrative level below municipalities, sectors and chieftaincies. They are chaired by the respective district and *groupement* chiefs and unite local police and communities. They feed the CLSP the information necessary to develop the PLS and keep it updated on the security concerns of the local population. During SSAPR, both CLSP and FQ meetings improved general knowledge of police work, helped overcome long-standing distrust between police and communities, fostered collaboration between them and ensured a modicum of accountability. Urban realities, however, are vastly different from those in rural areas. Implementing the CLSP decree outside the city is a serious challenge, with some coming to criticize it as a project conceptualized for cities, with few chances of succeeding in rural environments.

Source: Prime Minister's Office, 'Décret CLSP.

While the initial ambition of the SSAPR was to continue for at least another five to ten years, and eventually extend its activities into rural areas, the project came to an abrupt end in 2015. Operation Likofi in the capital, Kinshasa, a campaign of brutal repression against youth gangs by the police force in 2013 and 2014, provoked international outcry over human rights abuses by the PNC. Although the SSAPR had not given support to the Kinshasa police—to the frustration of the PNC, DFID and SSAPR staff—the UK government

decided to shut down the programme.[36] Its activities and successes thus remain limited to only three cities and the extension of the CLSP to rural areas slowed down considerably.

With the national government pledging to reinvigorate police reform and with the provincial government serious about establishing CLSPs across the province, plans for a CLSP extension into the countryside are again back on the agenda. The logics of governance that permeate DRC security institutions, however, stand in direct opposition to the ambitions of police reform. In the absence of a coherent security strategy in the countryside, rural administrators are forced to cope as best they can by governing security on a day-to-day basis. Kalehe and the chieftaincy of Buhavu provide insightful lessons into the realities and practices of local security governance in rural areas.

---

36   Bureau Conjoint des Nations Unies aux Droits de l'Homme, 'Rapport du Bureau conjoint des Nations Unies aux Droits de l'Homme sur les violations des droits de l'homme commises par des agents de la Police Nationale Congolaise dans le cadre de l'opération "Likofi" à Kinshasa entre le 15 novembre 2013 et le 15 février 2014', Kinshasa: MONUSCO, 2014. Accessed 4 October 2019, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/LikofiReportOctober2014_fr.pdf; Steve Hopkins, 'More than £50 million of British foreign aid was given to police in Congo despite reports they executed nine people including a child, Daily Mail, 28 November 2014. Accessed 4 October 2019, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2853105/More-50million-British-foreign-aid-given-police-Congo-despite-reports-executed-nine-people-including-child.html.

Box 2: Overview of Kalehe, Buhavu and Buzi

Situated in the north-east of South Kivu province in the eastern Congo and one of its eight territories, Kalehe covers more than 5,000 square kilometres and has around 815,000 inhabitants. Kalehe neighbours the province of North Kivu, in particular the territories of Masisi and Walikale in the north, and borders Lake Kivu in the east, the territory of Kabare in the south and Shabunda, the largest territory in South Kivu, in the west. The Kahuzi-Biega National Park edges all of the border with Shabunda and parts of the boundary with Kabare. Flora and fauna in Kalehe are remarkably diverse. From the beaches of Lake Kivu in the east, it stretches up to the *Moyens* and *Hauts Plateaux* (Middle and High Mountain Ranges), the peaks of which reach 2,500 metres. From there, a long formation of valleys and hills descend and ascend to eventually reach the edges of the national park in the west and south.

Kalehe is divided into two chieftaincies, Buhavu and Buloho, each led by a *mwami* (customary chief). Buhavu extends from the shores of Lake Kivu to the national park in the west, and embraces the much smaller Buloho in its centre. Buhavu soil is incredibly rich, both for agriculture and with minerals. The chieftaincy covers more than 3,500 square kilometres. It is home to between 650,000 and 700,000 people, the majority of whom are from the Havu ethnic community, followed by Tembo, Rongeronge, Hutu and Tutsi. According to the 2019 local development plan of the chieftaincy, its people live off less than USD 30 per month and only around 3 per cent have access to electricity.

Buhavu is divided into seven *groupements* with Buzi, where the field research for this report took place, being one of them. Buzi consists of 13 villages, which neighbour the North Kivu Masisi territory in the north and the Kalehe Mbinga-Nord *groupement* in the south. In the east, the Bulenga peninsula stretches into Lake Kivu and in the west, it extends up to the *Hauts Plateaux*, where it shares a border with the Ziralo groupement. The main urban centre in Buzi is Minova, which is the largest urban area in Kalehe. Minova is also the seat of the territorial police headquarters and a *chef de poste* (post chief), who reports directly to the *administrateur territorial* (AT, territorial administrator). Both the *mwami* and the AT, along with the central government institutions of the territory and the secretariat of the customary chief, reside in the *chef-lieu* (county seat) of the territory, Kalehe centre, roughly 90 km to the south of Minova.

Similar to Kalehe as a whole, Buzi has diverse landscapes (from beaches to mountains), a variety of economies (from the fishing villages in Bulenga and Kasunyu to the mines and cattle herding in the *Moyens* and *Hauts Plateaux*) and is home to both villages and urban centres. Its security challenges range from rapid urban growth in Minova via armed robberies of fisher folk on Lake Kivu to land conflicts, ethnic tensions and active armed groups in the *Hauts Pleateaux*.

Source: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 'Plan de développement local de la Chefferie de Buhavu 2019–2023', March 2010 (on file with author); Kalehe territory, 'Plan d'action de sécurité: Territoire de Kalehe', January 2019 (on file with author); Action pour la Paix et la Concorde,'Conflits fonciers et dynamiques de cohabitation en territoire de Kalehe, Sud-Kivu, est de la RDC', Bukavu: Life & Peace Institute, 2012; interview with members of fishing association, Kasunyu, 12 July 2019; interview with Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019.

4. Governing local security in Kalehe

As an administrative entity, Kalehe faces no shortage of challenges: A lack of infrastructure, inaccessibility and land conflicts; stark poverty, high unemployment and sparse public services; ill equipped, badly trained and barely paid security forces; and armed groups replacing state actors not only in governing security, but also in levying taxes.[37] To complicate matters, administrative authorities find themselves in a tug-of-war over who is responsible for state security and civil society spends much of their time infighting. In such a context, administrators, customary chiefs, police and soldiers rely on community leaders and village dignitaries to join efforts to guarantee a measure of security.

Policing rural Kalehe

Policing Kalehe is a considerable task. On the *Hauts Plateaux* of Buhavu, in the much contested *cinq collines* (five hills),[38] not 20 km from Numbi, the largely Hutu Nyatura armed group controls Lumbishi and stretches of surrounding land. Much of the neighbouring Ziralo *groupement* is under the influence of Mai Mai Kirikicho, headquartered at Tushunguti. The Mai Mai Kirikicho once again have become a powerful force. An exception is the village of Chambombo, 25 kilometres west of Numbi, which is in the hands of the *Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie* (CNRD, National Council for Renewal and Democracy), a splinter group of the *Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda* (FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a Hutu armed group, the origins of which date back to the Rwandan genocide and its spill over in to the eastern DRC.[39]

37 Hoffmann et al., 'Taxation, stateness and armed groups'; Koen Vlassenroot, Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga and Kasper Hoffmann, 'Contesting Authority: Armed rebellion and military fragmentation in Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016; Kasper Hoffman and Koen Vlassenroot, 'Armed groups and the exercise of public authority: the cases of the Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu', Peacebuilding 2/2 (2014).

38 See Box 3. Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga, 'Les conflits fonciers à l'Est de la RDC: au-delà de la confrontation entre rwandophones et autochtones à Kalehe', in L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2012–2013, eds. Filip Reyntjens, Stefan Vandeginste and Marije Verpoorten, Paris: Harmattan, 2013: 195–218.

39 Since the time of writing, a major army offensive against the CNRD was launched in Kalehe, which led to considerable displacements of combatants as well as communities.

Armed groups are the central threat to security in three of four security priority zones highlighted by the Kalehe 2019 *Plan d'action de sécurité* (PAS, Security Action Plan).[40] A police officer in Numbi puts it plainly: 'It is them who rule over there. They manage the population over there. In Lumbishi, no state services exist anymore.'[41] He goes on to say that 'weapons circulate a bit everywhere' and that 'for us, the police, it has become impossible to work properly'. He explains that to detain a suspect in Shanje and return them to Numbi, a mere 7 km away, is currently much too risky due to the threat of surprise attacks by armed elements on the way back. Moreover, for police to stand up to armed groups and their leaders, such as self-declared General Kirikicho, is no easy feat: 'A policeman with the rank of a commissioner or deputy commissioner [the army equivalent of lieutenant and sub-lieutenant] has nothing to say in front of Kirikicho. It is he who governs over there.' In the Congo, dealing with armed groups is not the task of the police but that of the army. As police and civilians alike point out, the most important security actor in Kalehe is the army, even if they also struggle to keep armed group activity at bay.[42] The only security zone where armed groups do not operate is Lake Kivu's coastline. Nonetheless, even in this area, where land conflicts, armed theft, the sale of drugs and hard liquor, and police and army harassment prevail, armed group recruitment and the illegal circulation of guns still pose a threat.

In Kalehe, distances are long. As a civil society representative puts it, 'Kalehe is a country.'[43] These challenges are worsened by decayed infrastructure, further complicating the work of both the army and police. The 50 km road from Minova up to Numbi, for example, is only practical by motorbike or by foot during the rainy season. The spread of the seats of key authorities and security actors adds to these complications. The court and state attorney are in Kalehe-centre, along with the territorial administrator and the chieftaincy secretariat. The territorial police commissariat, however, is in Minova, 90 km away. The *Tribunal de grande instance* (regional court)*,* which has jurisdiction over cases of sexual violence, is even further away in Kavumu, close to Bukavu.

Add to this the dismal working conditions of the police in rural areas. A police officer in Numbi complains: 'We have absolutely nothing, not even handcuffs. The equipment I have is the uniform, a beret and boots.'[44] A colleague in Minova echoes his sentiments:

40 Kalehe territorial administration, 'Plan d'Action de Sécurité', January 2019; Grouping of Buzi, 'Rapport du forum de groupement de Buzi organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité', draft, no date; Grouping of Mbinga-Nord, 'Rapport du forum de groupement de Mbinga-Nord organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité', April 2018; Grouping of Mbinga-Sud, 'Rapport du forum de groupement de Mbinga-Sud organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité', April 2018. All reports on file with author.

41 Interview with two police officers, Numbi, 11 July 2019. The remaining quotes in this paragraph are also derived from this source.

42 Interview with civil society member, Numbi, 11 July 2019; interview with Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019.

43 Interview with civil society member, Minova, 10 July 2019.

44 Interview with two police officers, Numbi, 11 July 2019.

'Here, we have zero cars, zero motorbikes, zero walkie-talkies, zero equipment.'[45] When asked about the police budget, he adds: 'That doesn't even exist. Challenge number one is the budget.' Minova police officers also feel that they are treated less well than their colleagues in cities who, according to them, receive transport money, cars and motorbikes. When a donor does hand over a jeep to the Kalehe police, it quickly disappears only to show up at a Bukavu police station.[46] As a police officer explains, the security of political elites trumps collective security in the Congo. He pointedly asks, 'How many police cars are in the governor's motorcade? Provincial members of parliament scold the police [for not properly doing their job] but are happy to have at least three protecting them. As the same police officer remarks, 'Then they wonder that we do not have the numbers [to do our job].'[47] He concludes by saying: 'It is a national disease. They have to be put back in school, the whole political class, the school of security governance.' Even if they were well equipped, the Kalehe police would not have the numbers necessary to go about their work effectively, let alone implement proximity police principles. The Ziralo *groupement*, for example, has 10 police for a population of around 30,000.[48] A police officer in Minova explains that a territorial commissariat should have 279 elements, 'But today, we are 22 police. Instead of 279, we are 22 police.'[49]

These are some of the factors that shape current police practices in Buzi, which include the detention of suspects beyond the 48-hour limit, requests that detainees or complainants pay for transport and the harassment of civilians. One police officer provides a succinct overview of the situation:

> Yes, there was once a problem between two school rectors who fought over who would direct the school. A police intervention was needed and we judged that it would be good for us to spend a whole week in that village for security reasons. But now, who would put up these policemen? This caused us much trouble. Every day, they called us [those who remained back in the station] that they were hungry, that they were not eating. We went to see the local administrator, who said he was deconcentrated [*déconcentré*] and that the police also need to participate in their provisioning … We went to see the *groupement* chief, who also could not help us and said we needed to improvise. So, by saying that we need to improvise [*se débrouiller*], that means either harassment or theft. And that's how the police fail in their mission. The police who are meant to protect the population, they become aggressive against this very population.

45 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019. The following quote is also derived from this source.

46 Participants in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.

47 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019. The following quotes are also derived from this source.

48 Kalehe territorial administration, 'Plan d'Action de Sécurité', January 2019 (on file with author).

49 Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.

Without adequate means and human resources, police reform and its principles of proximity in rural areas are put to a serious test. A police officer sums up: '[A police] mission equals means'.[50] A local administrator concurs, 'Security without means is always difficult.'[51] At the heart of local security governance in Kalehe, then, is the question of who is responsible for financing security.

Taking responsibility for local security

As ETDs, chieftaincies enjoy budgetary autonomy and have a range of new responsibilities. The *mwami*, for example, wears two hats, one as the traditional chief and one as relatively autonomous administrator. In other words, this means that the *mwami* is responsible for organizing and co-financing security in that administrative territory, playing an active role in security governance. Some chiefs are very active.[52] Others, however, are more reluctant and limit their activities to the socio-economic development of their entities.[53] Some customary chiefs are also young and inexperienced. They prefer not to be involved in the everyday matters of running their chieftaincy, instead entrusting this to their teams. They may lack the required gravitas, perhaps even confidence, to request meetings with high-ranking police and army officers in their administrative territory to talk security. An agent of the South Kivu division for decentralization cautiously explains that chiefs 'are not yet conscious of their responsibilities'.[54]

How much of a role a customary chief plays in relation to local security is thus also a question of individual leadership. In the case of Buhavu, for example, a civil society member complains that 'there is not even a C*onseil de sécurité* [security council] at the chieftaincy level.'[55] This lack of will makes it difficult to establish a CLSP. In fact, an international consortium involved in security governance decided to skip the chieftaincy in the elaboration of a *Plan local de sécurité* (PLS, Local Security Plan, situated at the ETD level) and instead worked with the territorial administration. With consortium support, the territorial administration drafted a *Plan d'action de sécurité* (PAS, Security Action Plan), the implementation of which, however, will be challenging without the proactive involvement of the chieftaincy.

50 Interview with police officer, Minova, 10 July 2019.

51 Interview with agent of territorial administration, Kalehe-centre, 11 July 2019.

52 For Kalehe's Buholo chieftaincy for example, see: Hoffmann et al., 'Taxation, stateness and armed groups'.

53 Interview with member of faith organization, Minova, 10 July 2019.

54 Interview with agent of decentralization division, Bukavu, 3 July 2019. ETDs struggle in general to cope with their new competences. This is reflected in the fact that, by June 2019, only 5 out of 27 EDTs in South Kivu had submitted their budget for the running financial year starting on 1 January 2019. Interview with civil society member and agent of the Bukavu urban administration, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.

55 Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.

Much actual decision-making in security governance remains situated at the level of the *entités territoriales déconcentrées* (deconcentrated territorial entities), which are not decentralized and thus remain executive bodies of the central administration and its policies, financially dependent on the latter and without legal personality of their own. Deconcentrated entities are the urban neighbourhoods, villages, groupings and territories. Security meetings, commonly referred to as CLSs, also tend to take place at these levels, and particularly so at the territorial level. Deconcentrated entities, however, often do not have the means to fund CLS meetings or to operationalize any urgent decisions taken in them. If operational costs are not forthcoming, territorial administrators and *groupement* chiefs need to either call on ETDs or rely on their improvisation skills. Here, then, lies a central conundrum of security governance and decentralization in rural areas: Those who have the means to invest in security do not always have the habit nor clout to do so; and those who are de facto managing security and do have the required experience, lack the funds for it.

In the case of Kalehe and Buhavu, this reality is the source of much frustration on all sides. A representative of the territorial administration puts the problem bluntly: 'For the chieftaincies [Buhavu and Buloho], for matters of security, they don't care. They are customary chiefs. But they forget that they wear two hats—a customary one and that of an agent of the state.'[56] One of his colleagues in the enclaved *Hauts Plateaux* adds: 'Normally, the chieftaincy ought to take charge of security. If it was conscientious, it could always support security.'[57] He goes on to argue that because the chieftaincy loses taxes from markets and cattle ranchers due to armed group activity, it harms itself by not investing in security: 'It is as if it has failed in its mission' because, after all, 'all development [which the chieftaincy claims to focus on] starts with security'.

At the same time, the deconcentrated entities all too often bypass the chieftaincy in matters of security, thus making it difficult for chieftaincy actors to play a more active role. The *chefs de poste* (post chiefs) in Numbi and Minova, for example, do not always feel it necessary to report to the *mwami;* they are appointed by the territorial administrator and that is the person to whom they report.[58]

Army and police representatives also confirm the limited role of the chieftaincy in security governance. Deployed in Kalehe since October 2016, an army commander insists that relations with the chief were good but then goes on to say: 'The *mwami* has never called me but if he did, we have to go because he is a *mwami*.'[59] While the Buhavu customary chief thus has a degree of authority, he rarely seems to use this in relation to security matters. The police are much more explicit in their observations. As one police officer states: 'The chieftaincy has not understood decentralization. It does not contribute to

56 Interview with agent of territorial administration, Kalehe-centre, 4 July 2019.

57 Interview with agent of territorial administration, Kalehe-centre, 11 July 2019.

58 Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019; interview with territorial administrators, Kalehe, 6 and 11 July 2019.

59 Interview with senior army officer, 9 July 2019.

the financing of the PNC, although everywhere else in the world, municipalities and cities do so.'[60] Another police officer concisely sums up: 'The chieftaincy does nothing for us.'[61]

While many point accusing fingers at the chieftaincy, its members argue that the responsibility for state security lies first and foremost with the central government and its decentralized entities. In their view, their main responsibility lies in the socio-economic development of their entity. Understandably, 'the chieftaincy cannot do everything at the same time'.[62] This comment reflects reality but simultaneously reveals general misunderstanding about the shared responsibilities the ETD chief has in matters of security. It also demonstrates a specific misunderstanding of the notion of human security that underpins police reform efforts, whereby local authorities, communities and development play a crucial role.

A second argument chieftaincy members put forward is that the authorities of deconcentrated entities want part of the already insufficient ETD budget to cover the costs of their own security meetings. In part, this budget shortfall is due to the lack of retrocession of taxes from the province and central government. In theory, around 42 per cent of the chieftaincy budget should be financed by the province and around 16 per cent should come from Kinshasa. According to an in-year report on the implementation of the 2018 national budget, by June that year, central government had sent less than 60 per cent of its mandated retrocession to the provinces and ETDs.[63] The province does not seem to retrocede at all, leaving a large gap in the chieftaincy budget. According to a chieftaincy member, since the start of decentralization in 2008–09, the province of South Kivu has in fact never retroceded any money back to Buhavu.[64] A third challenge identified by the chieftaincy is what Buhavu representatives call '*incivisme fiscal*', a lack of civic duty. Too many residents, commercial enterprises and companies dodge taxes, and tax collectors all too often keep part of what they collect for themselves.

Despite budgetary shortfalls, the chieftaincy does cover security costs from time to time. With its first autonomous budget, for example, the chieftaincy paid for walkie-talkies for all state security actors. While their current revenue does not allow for such expenses anymore, they still reportedly cover CLS participation costs from time to time, despite the lack of any prior agreement on an appropriate budget and not being informed by the territorial administration about meetings. A participant in a CLS meeting offers a telling example. At the end of the meeting, participants who had come from afar raised their

60 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

61 Interview with police officer, Numbi, 11 July 2019.

62 Interview with civil society member, 8 July 2019, Kalungu.

63 Ministry of Budget, 'Commentaires sur les états de suivi budgétaire à fin juin 2018 (situation provisoire)', Kinshasa: Ministry of Budget, 9 July 2018. Accessed 4 October 2019, https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/documents/comments-on-the-monitoring-statements-budget-at-the-end-of-june-2018.

64 Interview with two agents of the chieftaincy, Kalehe-centre, 13 July 2019. The following quote is also derived from this source.

hands and asked: 'But now that we have finished, what do we do [to get back home]?'[65] Contradicting chieftaincy claims, the CLS meeting participant goes on to explain that all too often, 'everybody has to pay from their own pocket'. He adds, 'Can you imagine an army colonel from Bunyakiri [around 150 km from Kalehe-centre] who comes on a motorbike? It's a disgrace!' Nevertheless, chieftaincy members insist that they contribute in such cases, doing so because of their sense of patriotism and solidarity: 'We intervene everywhere because we are here. We tell ourselves that the population cannot continue to suffer.'[66]

In sum, security interventions cost money, which both deconcentrated and decentralized authorities claim not to have. In a focus group discussion, one police officer succinctly accuses all sides including that of the police for not taking up their responsibilities:

> I represent the police, and there are also the authorities and the population. That is, there is a triangle, a space of interaction. Everybody has to play their role. But you will find that there is no real interaction, and the authorities do not play their role for the security service. And the police have difficulties doing their work for the population because they are not equipped, and the population doesn't really trust its police much because the police doesn't have the means to do their work for the population. And so this triangle is not really effective. The authorities don't play their role and the police, although they could play their role, have difficulties doing so, and the population lack trust.[67]

Another police officer, sceptical about the level of chieftaincy support for local security, directly asks: 'Is there even a line for security in the chieftaincy budget?'[68] Considering that both deconcentrated and decentralized territorial administrators claim to have no means, it is worth exploring how an ETD such as Buhavu budgets for security.

Budgeting for local security

Decentralization has had a direct impact on public finances and budgeting exercises in the DRC. There are now three kinds of budgets: ETD budgets, which are integrated into *budgets provinciaux* (provincial budgets); in turn, provincial budgets are integrated into the budget from the *pouvoir central* (central government) to make up the *budget de l'état* (state budget). To facilitate this process of upward integration, the central government fixes budget categories, lines and items through which national, provincial and ETD

---

65 Interview with CLS participant, Kalehe-centre, 4 July 2019. The following quotes are also derived from this source.

66 Interview with two agents of the chieftaincy, Kalehe-centre, 13 July 2019.

67 Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019. The following quote is also derived from this source.

68 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

budgets are organized. This template is then filled in by the respective authorities at the decentralized levels according to their expected revenues and expenses.[69]

Local security matters do not have a specific budget line but security-related expenses do show up more indirectly. The Buhavu 2019 budget amounts to a little less than USD 2 million, of which the chieftaincy aims to contribute 42 per cent (approximately USD 800,000). Current expenditure makes up half of the total budget or USD 1 million.[70] Its second largest sub-category is service expenditure (*dépenses de prestations*), which is slightly less than 30 per cent of that (approximately USD 290,000). Security-related expenses appear here. A first appearance of such expenses is listed under the transport expenses sub-sub-category, which represents 5.7 per cent of the overall service expenditure. The budget item for rental and chartering of means of transport dedicates USD 7,400 (45 per cent of total transport expenses) to car rentals for chieftaincy staff, which is explicitly justified by their need to attend CLS meetings.

A second much more intriguing budget item is 5-6131, referring to *Fonds secrets de recherche* (FSR, Secret Research Fund), which is tucked away under the sub-category labelled as 'other services'. It totals roughly USD 150,000, or more than half of the total service expenditure category under which it sits, and making up approximately 16 per cent of the total current expenditure in Buhavu. This is a considerable amount. An explanatory note breaks down the FSR into three specific categories: Civil investigation; justice; and other surveillance (*autres filatures*), which is endowed with USD 65,000 (around 42 per cent of the total). The budget note explains:

> The expenditure related to this category concerns research, investigation and other surveillance actions led by civil, military, and security and justice services. There is much turmoil caused by armed groups in the Buhavu chieftaincy to the extent that surveillance and investigation actions are indispensable in order to try and reduce new actions by anticipating their movements.[71]

According to chieftaincy staff, the FSR covers the organization cost of CLS meetings.[72] Looking at the USD 150,000 per year (USD 12,500 per month) FSR budget, however, it is difficult to argue that the chieftaincy does not have sufficient funds to support local security matters—even when taking into account the absence of retrocession and the challenges in local tax collection. While the FSR has the potential and flexibility to be used to fund local security, two obstacles remain. First, without retrocession and with feeble tax collection, this budget line will likely be cut in half if not more, somewhat limiting that

---

69 Journal Officiel, 'Loi relative aux finances publiques', Nomenclature budgétaire de la République Démocratique du Congo, Nomenclature des dépenses, Édition 2015, (on file with author).

70 Chieftaincy of Buhavu, Budgetary decision Nr 33 from 31 December 2018 for the 2019 exercise, Kalehe, December 2018; and Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 'Expenditure part: Budget 2019', Buhavu: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, no date (on file with author).

71 Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 'Expenditure part: Budget 2019', 79.

72 Interview with two agents of the chieftaincy, Kalehe-centre, 13 July 2019.

potential and providing the chieftaincy with a ready excuse. Second and more importantly, as long as the chieftaincy considers matters of local security to be the responsibility of the central state and its deconcentrated entities, it is unlikely that it will ever prioritize police support or local security projects.

Civil society could play an important role in demanding more financial accountability and transparency in matters of public finance, in particular asking the chieftaincy to reprioritize how it spends its FSR budget. Civil society representatives, however, find it difficult to speak with one voice.

Fragmented civil society in Buzi

Civil society in the Congo has a history of being politicized either because its organizations have been substitutes for political mobilization and expression or because the state has actively tried to subsume them. Given that the Belgian Congo suppressed political parties almost up to its end, Congolese political engagement from the 1950s onward occurred largely through associations with an ostensibly non-political cause such as ethnic support networks, which eventually did turn into political parties. Mobutu's one-party state also clamped down on political mobilization, leaving faith and civil society organizations as the only viable recourse for political expression. Concerned about their potential for resistance, Mobutu responded with a mixed and changing strategy of coercion, oppression and co-optation.[73]

This politicization has rendered civil society as an active battleground for everyday politics, as well as a springboard into political life. Political cleavages thus run through civil society and have led to fragmentation. In South Kivu, for example, at least four associations compete to function as an umbrella for all civil society organizations, with some having political backers who pull strings outside the public eye. Civil society remains an indispensable partner for central and local government, and the security services, because its members play an important role in sensitizing communities, relaying government and administrative decisions back to them, and in influencing their perceptions of a given government action or policy. In the realm of local security matters, civil society in Buzi well illustrates such interactions and the consequences of their fragmentation.

Outside the CLSe, the role of Buzi civil society is largely limited to informal interactions with authorities and security actors. In the words of a civil society representative, 'We cross paths on the same road.'[74] If such exchanges are deemed insufficient to address security concerns, civil society reverts to more confrontational approaches to make its voice heard. As a civil society member puts it: 'Civil society does not take the time to

---

73   See Schatzberg, *Dialectics of Oppression*, 115–134, for the case of religious groups; Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline,* 138–163.

74   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe centre, 6 July 2019; interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019

meet around a table and then approach authorities.'[75] To the frustration of many security actors, for example, civil society is known to publicly call out grievances such as army road blocks, excessive taxes or police abuse via social media or local radio to put pressure on authorities to act. As another civil society representative explains, 'When talking, they understand. But when acting, there is no change. … Authorities are like motorbikes. You have to kick start them.'[76]

The fragmented nature of civil society complicates a coherent and permanent exchange with security actors. It is common for umbrella organizations to hold their own gatherings to discuss local security, draw up lists of grievances and priorities, and then send their own delegation to the police to present these. The police find this frustrating, as they spend time meeting with various organizations claiming to represent the same communities. During elections, each umbrella organization verbally attacks the security services—regardless of actual justification—to score quick points with their own electorate. One irritated police officer, for example, claims that a civil society leader recently argued that to avoid traffic police harassment, the automobile association, and not the police, should manage car accidents; he goes on to explain that the leader likely did so to gain the support of this very influential association but, in the eyes of the police, this merely shows that 'They [civil society actors] are hyper ignorant.'[77] Another police officer adds: 'Civil society tells the population that the police are their enemy. We, however, are like fish in the water and the population is our sea. But we are fish who have to live in that sea.'[78]

Civil society fragmentation, combined with an often uncoordinated and confrontational approach to engaging the authorities and security services, complicates rapprochement, which is central to the ambitions of both decentralization and police reform. While tugs-of-war between the administration and chieftaincy continue, and while civil society organizations battle one another and the police, insecurity in Kalehe endures. In the absence of a more coordinated response from the national and provincial authorities, local administrators, police and community leaders make do as best they can.

Coping with insecurity

In the face of authorities that avoid responsibility and in the absence of sufficient budgets, it is difficult to find sustainable solutions to insecurity. If specific grievances remain unaddressed over time, particularly harassment and abuse by the security services, civil society leaders tend to resort to calls for *auto-prise en charge* (to take care of oneself). At a civil society meeting on security, for example, a civil society representative suggests a step-by-step plan of escalation: First, they would give their list of grievances to the authorities

75   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019.

76   Interview with member of civil society, Kaleh- centre, 5 July 2019. The following quote is also derived from this source.

77   Interview with police officer, Minova, 9 July 2019.

78   Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.

and the police; and second, 'If the police do nothing, we the people, we will take care of ourselves.'[79] In the context of the DRC, this phrase is often understood as taking justice into one's own hands. Criticizing this practice, a police officer asserts that, 'taking care of oneself in the Congo means killing everyone and setting police stations on fire.'[80]

Box 3: Major fault lines in the history of Buzi

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Buzi *groupement* has sought more independence from the chieftaincy of Buhavu. Over time, these efforts have met with successes and failures. They have also triggered tension and conflict, which continue to impact civil society in Buzi and Buhavu in 2019. Understanding this history is of paramount importance for grasping the stakes at play in the realm of security governance.

In the late nineteenth century, Rwandan King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri (1853–1895) conducted several military excursions in the Kivus, including the neighbouring Buhavu chieftaincy. To settle the conflict, Ntale, the Buhavu *mwami*, offered his son, Hubert Sangara, as war booty to Rwabugiri. Ntale expected the Rwandan king to kill his son but he instead raised him as his own. Once a young man, Sangara was allowed to return to Buhavu. To make peace with his son, Ntale gave him the Bulenga peninsula to rule as his own. Under Sangara's leadership, Buzi slowly emerged as an entity of its own, with the people from Bulenga and their autonomous spirit at its heart.

The Belgian colonizers liked Sangara, who knew how to exploit this relationship for business and political benefit. Such was Sangara's influence that after independence in 1968, Buzi annexed neighbouring Ziralo to form the Buzi–Ziralo *groupement*. For the next ten years, Sangara pursued a policy of land occupation to strengthen his claim over the largely unoccupied borderlands between both *groupements* on the *Hauts Plateaux* by granting lands to Hutu and Tutsi communities. They settled there and paid him royalties, and remain loyal to Buzi up to the present. Ziralo (which regained autonomy in 1978), however, claims a stretch of this borderland that remains strongly contested up to this day. This contested borderland is a mineral-rich zone comprised of Numbi, Lumbishi, Luzirandaka, Ngandjo and Shanje, referred to as the *cinq collines* (five hills). This conflict is directly linked to long-standing tensions over territory, authority and access to power between the Havu and Tembo, the former having been historically favoured by the colonizers at the expense of the latter.

The same Rwandophone community, which now forms the majority on the *Hauts Plateaux* due to Sangara's settlement plans, nevertheless feels marginalized at the territorial level because they do not have any effective administrative power beyond the village level. In the 1980s and early 1990s, political debates around Congolese citizenship risked undermining community claims to this territory and triggered calls of armed mobilization by Hutu communities to protect their lands. These grievances around land, identity and citizenship add another layer of complexity to Buzi. In this already opaque context, the

---

79 Participant in civil society security meeting held in Minova, 9 July 2019.
80 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

Rwandan civil war and 1994 genocide spilled into the eastern Congo, followed by the First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars.

The occupation of much of the eastern Congo by Rwandan and Ugandan-backed armed groups aggravated existing fault lines between Rwandophones and autochtonous communities. To garner local legitimacy, the occupiers backed various local movements calling for more autonomy. In 1999, they incorporated the villages of Lowa-Numbi on the *Hauts Plateaux* into the Mianzi *groupement*, headed by a Tutsi chief. Buzi also received the long sought status of *chefferie*, headed by Sangara's son, Raymond Sangara Bera, further complicating the relationship between Buzi and Buhavu. Although Buzi is once again a *groupement* (since 2003), tensions still persist.

Source: Action pour la Paix et la Concorde, 'Analayse de context du territoire de Kalehe', Bukavu: Life and Peace Institute, 2009; Kasper Hoffman, 'Ethnogovernmentality: The Making of Ethnic Territories and Subjects in Eastern Congo', PhD thesis, Roskilde University, Copenhagen, 2014; interview with Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019.

In rural areas, communities have little choice but to organize themselves outside official security channels. It is here that village and *groupement* chiefs play active roles in attempts to protect their own. Such efforts can consist of mobilizing youth patrols at night, organizing their own militias, involving the nearest army unit in their protection or making tenuous pacts with existing armed groups. Involving the army or existing armed groups, however, is a double-edged sword and has potential to backfire.[81] If insecurity (such as armed robberies) goes unabated despite calls for help, communities may resort to *justice populaire* (popular justice), the act of beating to death thieves caught in the act or burning them alive. This practice is widely spread across the eastern DRC, especially in rural areas, where police are few and far between. A Bukavu-based human rights organization monitoring incidents of insecurity recorded 36 such cases in 2018.[82] In the Kalehe Mbinga-Sud *groupement*, for example, armed burglars targeted the village of Kasheke over a few months in 2019 but despite calls by the villagers for the police or army to intervene, nothing happened.[83] In early July, the villagers captured two of the burglars and

---

81 Judith Verweijen, 'Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus', *Review of African Political Economy* 40/135 (2013); Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, 'Arbiters with guns: the ambiguity of military involvement in civilian disputes in the DR Congo', *Third World Quarterly* 35/5; Vlassenroot et al., 'Contesting Authority'; Oxfam, 'In the Balance: Searching for Protection in eastern DRC', Oxfam Briefing Paper 179, 27 January 2014. Accessed 4 October 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/media/files/bp-in-the-balance-protection-eastern-drc-270114-en.pdf.

82 Synergie des associations des jeunes pour l'éducation civique et électorale et la promotion des droits de l'homme au Sud-Kivu-Forces Vives, 'Sud-Kivu 2018: 345 personnes tuées, 881maisons attaquées par des bandits armés, 232 cas d'enlèvement et 36 cas de justice populaire en une seule année', SAJECEK Bulletin Nr. 60, Bukavu: SAJECEK, 23 January 2019.

83 Interview with member of judiciary, Kalehe-centre, 4 July 2019; interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019. Subsequent information in this paragraph is derived from these sources.

killed them on the spot. It was only after this that civil society organizations, the territorial administration and security services went to Kasheke to calm the situation and organize a CLSe.

More commonly, however, communities work together with their local administrators to find solutions to the most urgent questions of insecurity. This was the case when the Nyatura armed group captured the village of Lumbishi on the *Hauts Plateaux,* during which several civilians lost their lives. The combatants did not bury them, which angered the villagers. The local administrator in Numbi convened community leaders and dignitaries in Lumbishi and Numbi to find a solution. They eventually agreed to contribute to transportation costs, which allowed the security services to evacuate the dead from Lumbishi. The administrator describes the contribution of the dignitaries as 'a sacrifice, it is patriotism', going on to explain that village chiefs become crucial intermediaries in these situations because they often have relations with members of armed groups and can therefore mediate between them and the affected communities or talk to the parents of combatants to convince them to demobilize. [84] This, the administrator says, would not be possible for state actors because they could get arrested or worse.

In practice, then, coping with insecurity and governing local security requires often tenuous and yet constant cooperation between local security actors, local authorities, community leaders, dignitaries and armed groups. They regularly exchange with one another—within the framework of the CLS, in ad hoc and reactive CLSe meetings (as in Kasheke), in emergency situations (as in Lumbishi) or during accidental encounters on the street, in restaurants or bars. Although some of these parties may sometimes be part of the problem, without their support, solutions are difficult to find.

That constant exchange—to keep everyone engaged, to keep talking and to keep all channels of communication open—may therefore be the single most important facet of how authorities and communities attempt to govern security in practice. Importantly, these local everyday practices of communication and inclusion are not dissimilar to the ambitions and spirit of the CLSP and FGs. As such, this pattern of constant communication may serve as a reminder about the value of learning from what works on the ground. That state and non-state security actors do keep talking in an attempt to resolve concerns on both sides as and where feasible may also serve to counterbalance their image as commonly portrayed in international media of being irrational, greedy or violent.

From scarcity to inaccessibility, and from tugs-of-war to civil society infighting, the realities of security governance in Kalehe are challenging. Nonetheless, communities come together with state and non-state security actors to negotiate and forge precarious and fast-shifting arrangements in order to cope with insecurity. The practices of security governance that have developed may indeed echo the spirit of the CLSPs and FGs, which draw on the reforms of the police and decentralization. Nevertheless, outside interventions,

---

84   Interview with local administrator, Numbi, 11 July 2019.

which aim to support the establishment of CLSPs and FGs, face a multitude of challenges and can be disruptive themselves.

5. Supporting the application of the 2013 CLSP decree in Buhavu

Due to its long history of armed conflict and ongoing armed group activity, Kalehe looks back on an extensive history of outside engagement in its security matters. Over the last ten years, outside interventions have been dominated by stabilization approaches, policies and missions, which attempt to infuse stability in still fragile post-conflict settings and lay the foundations for state reconstruction and socio-economic development.[85] Kalehe has been a priority zone of the DRC government stabilization programme, the Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC) since its inception in 2009. As such, it has been the stage for countless such programmes by national and international NGOs, UN bodies and the DRC peacekeeping mission. Many of these programmes are funded by the international stabilization strategy that supports STAREC, the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S).[86]

One programme which is aligned with I4S is the programme 'Inawezekana Kalehe', implemented by a consortium made up of three Dutch organizations—ZOA, VNGi and War Child Holland—and funded by the Dutch government's Addressing Root Causes (ARC) fund. It has a budget of EUR 8.2 million (USD 9.2 million) and will run from 2017 to 2021. Aligned with the Dutch government, a key donor to the I4S, consortium activities are aligned with central pillars of the strategy, including the focus on peaceful community conflict resolution, improved local governance, mutual accountability between the local population and local government, and the empowerment of women and youth. ARC focus zones cover four of the seven Buhavu *groupements*, including the *Hauts Plateaux* with its complex conflicts and armed group activity. In the consortium, VNGi promotes the restoration of state authority and mutual accountability between government and communities. In doing so, it works directly with provincial, territorial, chieftaincy and *groupement* authorities. In line with ARC objectives around improved governance and mutual accountability, VNGi has supported the establishment of the FGs at the *groupement* level and has also been exploring support to create a CLSP at the chieftaincy level.

These are ambitious interventions oriented to changing current security governance structures and logics, along with power relations between authorities, security actors and local communities. Tracing the efforts to implement the CLSP in rural areas showcases both several key challenges for such outside interventions and a potential opportunity.

85   Emily Paddon and Guillaume Lacaille, 'Stabilising the Congo', Forced Migration Policy Briefing 9, Oxford: University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 2011; Rift Valley Institute, 'Stabilization in Eastern and Central Africa: Insights from Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2014.

86   Also known as ISSS or I4S. See: International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, 'International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, 2013–2017', 2013.

Challenges include misunderstandings, confusion and manipulation, and the creation of parallel civil society structures. The opportunity consists of providing avenues for supporting local authorities and communities through better use of existing funds to improve local security.

Limits to applying the CLSP

While the police play an important role in I4S, stabilization does not necessarily align smoothly with police reform and its underlying assumption that a sufficient degree of stability already prevails. Police reform and its own CLSP and FGs are complex subject matters in themselves. The UK-funded SSAPR, for example, took several years to sensitize communities, authorities and the police on police reform objectives and principles. The programme had a large roster of Congolese and international experts on police reform and a budget of GBP 60 million (USD 87 million) at its disposal. SSAPR's focus was on cities, where infrastructure and proximity made project implementation much faster and cheaper. Despite these relative advantages, SSAPR faced many difficulties in implementing police reform.[87] VNGi aims to do the same but with less time, a smaller budget, a much smaller team, less expertise and in remote rural areas. Unsurprisingly, several difficulties have emerged.

First, in order to effectively support police reform, winning over the police is essential. While most police officers appreciate the notion of proximity policing, putting its principles into practice necessitates training, money and equipment and thus constitutes a major challenge. A police officer complains, 'We remain at the level of words but not action.'[88] He adds: 'We only talk about what the police should not do. But what about what the police should do?'[89] International NGOs and donors are often reluctant to train and provide equipment to the police or subsidize their work due to a mix of concerns about sustainability, substituting for core state responsibilities, the risk of embezzlement and, worse, giving materials to some who may use them against civilians.[90] VNGi does not directly support the police, which makes it difficult to gain sufficient leverage with the PNC and next to impossible to turn them into a proactive proximity police that follows the logic of the intended reform and the CLSP. Directly linked to this is a lack of understanding of police reform principles among the police themselves. Many police officers in Kalehe have never been trained, some do not speak French and others cannot write. In the words of

87 Palladium, 'Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report', London: Palladium, 2015; Thill, et al., 'Everyday police life'.

88 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

89 Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

90 Ibrahim Bangura, 'Democratically Transformed or Business as Usual: The Sierra Leone Police and Democratic Policing in Sierra Leone', *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 7/1 (2018); Keith Biddle, 'Interview with Keith Biddle', Innovations for Successful Societies, Oral History Programme, Princeton: Princeton University, 2007.

one police officer, while the 'will is there, the notions that VNGi brings along are international notions. Not everyone has the capacity to understand.'[91]

Second, interventions by international NGOs often occur at the same time in the same sector, with their own sometimes contradictory logics. They also tend to follow in the footsteps of past programmes run by yet other organizations, all of which shapes how they are perceived by supposed beneficiaries. Some police officers have been irritated by past NGO interventions, which has made them sceptical about ARC efforts. Search for Common Ground, for example, which had previously been working with the Kalehe police in its long-running *Lobi Mokolo Ya Siku* (tomorrow is another day) programme, reportedly told communities that according to the first of the ten golden rules of police reform, police services were free. While this is certainly true, a lack of explanation and contextualization left police officers confused.[92] The same officer rhetorically asks: 'Is this true? It is a lie'[93] as it ignores the fact that police charge fines for law violations. He complains that imposing fines now often leads to civil disobedience because people refuse to pay.

Another police officer echoes the feeling that NGO work insists too much on citizen rights without supporting the police: 'Today, people talk about human rights but we think that the rights of police also exist! Human rights, yes, but the police, too! People do not respect the rights of the police.'[94] Others point to the fact that international NGOs also need to intervene at the level of the national government, and not only at the local level: 'I don't know if Search [for Common Ground] also lobbies the government, whose job it is to equip the police for us to guarantee this free service.'

In terms of the CLSP and FGs, his colleague further nuances this analysis by underlining the important aspect of community participation within these platforms and that they therefore should be embedded within the Congolese state: 'Listen! The *forum de quartier* [*forum de groupement* in rural areas] is the most appropriate way to diagnose the population's security problems because the state will not go away but Search [for Common Ground] has left. Any NGO can leave but the state will stay.'

Third, there have also been significant obstacles to the establishment of the FGs, which constitute the bedrock of police–community partnership and accountability. Initially, ARC intended to cover four of the seven *groupements* in Buhavu, with particular focus on the *Hauts Plateaux* and its complex conflicts and armed group activity. While this may make

---

91   Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019. The following quotes are also derived from this source.

92   Search for Common Ground, 'Final Evaluation: Phase IV of Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika', November 2018.

93   Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

94   Participants in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019. The following quotes are also derived from this source.

sense for stabilization,[95] it goes against the logic of police reform and the CLSP, which relies on reports from all *groupements* and their FGs to develop the *Plan local de sécurité* (PLS, local security plan). VNGi therefore extended its scope to include all seven. Consequently, its already relatively limited budget now has to make do with this expansion, stretching capacities ever thinner. Since the beginning of the project, for example, chieftaincy sources are not able to confirm with confidence that any actual CLSP meeting has ever taken place.[96] Moreover, the lack of a PLS and the existence of a PAS (*Plan d'action de sécurité*, Security Action Plan) further vindicate their lack of interest in changing existing security governance. A lack of will, then, on the side of the chieftaincy, and the realities of rural areas, where authorities have to cover vast distances to attend far away meetings, certainly play their part in the difficulties of setting up a CLSP. A limited budget, few staff and scarce time on the side of VNGi, however, do not help in ensuring the support and follow up that is required when the objective is to transform something as complex as the governance of local security.

Somewhat more concerning is the fact that some international NGOs also engaging in security sector reform pursue different logics than that of ARC, opting instead to promote the CLS and CLSe because they remain unconvinced by the CLSP and its FGs, despite the latter being rooted in Congolese law. A main reason for this seems to be the difficulty in engaging chieftaincies on matters of local security. Due to the reluctance of chiefs, some international NGOs are actively lobbying the national government in Kinshasa to further strengthen the role of the CLS and CLSe by anchoring them in a legal framework in order to more easily work with territorial administrations, instead of chieftaincies, on security matters. Indeed, ARC and VNGi ultimately decided to proceed with the process of drafting a security action plan, a key CLSP output, at the territorial level. In January 2019, the territorial administration published the PAS, which draws on the different FG security diagnoses and was elaborated under the supervision of the territorial administrator, not the customary chief. Although this circumvents the problem of the non-functioning CLSP, it does not resolve the issue that the territory lacks the funds to finance the actions called for in the plan. While the PAS builds on the FG security diagnoses—a definite step forward—it leaves little decision-making power on issues of security at the level of the chieftaincy, thus keeping security governance largely centralized. Finally, this circumvention may risk increasing tensions between chieftaincy and territory, further complicating collaboration and simultaneously creating potential competition on matters of security.[97]

95   An expert on Kalehe, who participated in an earlier ARC conceptual meeting, says that focusing on the *Hauts Plateaux* would also have been dangerous as it may have been perceived as favouring its Rwandophone communities and would thus would have risked exacerbating existing tensions among them and autochtonous groups, thus countering any efforts at stabilization. Interview with Kalehe expert, Bukavu, 19 July 2019.

96   Exchanges with agents of Buhavu chieftaincy, WhatsApp messaging, 11 October 2019 and Bukavu, 28 Novemeber 2019.

97   Interview with staff of international NGO, Bukavu, 29 June 2019; interview with staff of international NGO, Bukavu, 30 June 2019.

Furthermore, introducing the language of the CLSP and FGs as new tools into existing security governance practice without clarifying their purpose and how they relate to and operate alongside the existing CLS and CLSe has led to a fair amount of confusion. Making sense of this amalgam of committees and councils is not easy for local communities and security actors, who are rarely familiar with their legal frameworks and practical intricacies. Many ARC government partners at the *groupement*, chieftaincy and territorial level who are meant to lead these meetings could not always distinguish these various acronyms, with some using the CLSP, FG and CLSe or CLS and CLSP interchangeably.[98] The prevailing confusion once again points to the limited time and budget the consortium has to invest in sensitization, which leads to a superficial understanding of the CLSP decree and the FGs, their purpose and function, and how they relate to the CLS and CLSe. In turn, this lack of understanding leads their conveners to not fully appropriate the logic of police reform and its proximity police.

Moreover, the CLSP decree postulates that its committee is made up of the chieftaincy (the sector or municipality chief), which presides over the trimester meetings, the police commander, an official of the justice ministry and two representatives of civil society. Article 9 of the decree also gives the CLSP president the liberty to invite anyone else relevant to discussing matters of local security. According to a civil society member involved in drafting the CLSP decree, this article was added precisely because some were worried that, on the one hand, in the context of the eastern DRC, the army, and intelligence and migration services would have to participate for meetings to be effective and, on the other hand, that two civil society delegates would not necessarily be sufficient to represent the diversity of civil society as a whole.[99] The subtlety of this article needs to be appreciated by those from VNGi and the chieftaincy, however, for the CLSP to unfold its full potential.

The FGs should function according to a similarly flexible logic, which bends itself to local realities. In Kalehe as in Bukavu, for instance, the FGs are not only organized to discuss concerns around local security but also to address matters of local development and priorities to be funded by the participatory budget. Using the FG for multiple purposes only strengthens community–state relations and fosters a degree of transparency and accountability. A formal decision made by the Buhavu *mwami* in March 2018, however, strictly defines the composition of FGs, lending unnecessary rigidity to what should be flexible. In addition to a long list of local authorities and community representatives, the March 2018 decision mentions five members of the security forces, to be led by the local head of the police.[100] In an attempt to encourage the Buloho chief to follow the practice of the FGs in his chieftaincy, the territorial administrator also made a similar decision at

98   Interviews with relevant agents and representatives in Kalehe-centre and Buzi, July 2019; observations during workshop on security governance and the CLSP decree in Bukavu, 27-29 November 2019.

99   Interview with former civil society member, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019.

100   Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 'Décision nr. 001 portant institutionalisation des forums des groupements dans les sept groupements de la chefferie de Buhavu', Buhavu: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 28 March 2018 (on file with author).

the level of the territory in June 2018. The list of qualified participants drawn up by the territorial administrator differs from that of the *mwami,* omitting some and, interestingly, explicitly mentioning five members of police—and not security forces, which would have included army, intelligence and migration services.[101] Neither decision provides for flexibility in composition beyond those listed. Moreover, their differences create a degree of legal ambivalence, which provides an easy excuse for *groupement* chiefs not to organize any meetings as they can claim not to know which decision to follow.

In a context such as Kalehe, the FARDC (*Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo*, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is undoubtedly the most important state security actor. An army officer mentions, however, that he had never been invited to an FG meeting.[102] A *groupement* chief also mentions that while he agreed that the FARDC are primary partners in matters of security, they are not invited to the FGs, which has led army officers to tease them about this rather obvious flaw in the logic of these new security governance platforms.[103] A civil society activist offers another criticism; namely, that the *groupement* chiefs select civil society participants, inviting only those who are favourable to him and not necessarily those truly representative of communities: 'All those there [in the FG], we don't even know them.'[104] A police officer strongly criticizes this kind of manipulation, which leads to a lack of relaying information back to citizens:

> Everyone should be represented but to say that only some can participate is not good. As it is only the leaders who participate, the population doesn't know anything about what is happening. They don't even know anything about what we talk about in meetings. If you ask the population, they know nothing! Who among the population can reply to you? Because it is only the leaders who participate but the people know nothing.[105]

The new practice of organizing the FGs in Buhavu, albeit on an irregular basis, is an important step forward in the long process of integrating community needs into local security governance. Nevertheless, it seems that the main purpose of the CLSP and FGs is misunderstood, ignored or manipulated. A central reason may lie in the ARC consortium approach to civil society. Knowing full well the difficulties of working with established civil society organizations and seeking more direct and representative partnerships with communities, particularly marginalized and minority groups, the consortium decided to seek out more direct community buy-in through its own community mobilization approach. The result of that process is the *cadre de concertation* (coordination cadre).

101   Territory of Kalehe, 'Décision nr. 5072/012/531/BUR-AT/KLH/2018 du 04/06/2018 portant institutionalisation des forums des groupements dans le territoire de Kalehe', 4 June 2018 (on file with author).

102   Interview with senior army officer, 9 July 2019.

103   Interview with former *groupement* chief, Bukavu, 2 July 2019.

104   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.

105   Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

The *cadre de concertation*

Engaging civil society is a prerequisite for most international NGO and donor programmes in the eastern DRC. The fragmented and politicized nature of this region, however, makes such work a delicate matter. ARC tried to circumvent this by creating the *cadre de concertation* through an approach led by ZOA to sensitize large and varied social groups across communities and foster ownership and democratic work approaches. The cadre was put together through a series of selection and election processes. First, each Buhavu *groupement* brought together a total of 40 representatives, made up of a wide range of associations and organizations with a particular focus on marginalized groups, such as youth, women, fisher folk and disabled people. These 40 representatives chose 10 among themselves to form the directorial committee for all 7 *groupements*. The committee sent three representatives to the territorial level, who held a vote to select their territorial representative. Once the representatives had been chosen, they became the go-to persons for all consortium-related activities involving local communities. In other words, they were now seen as the legitimate voices of the local communities.[106] Not everyone, however, is convinced about this process and its outcome.

One civil society member argues that the cadre is not large enough and hence not sufficiently inclusive—considering the size of the seven Buzi *groupements*, he says, 40 members are simply too few.[107] Another adds that villages have been neglected: 'At the level of the village, there is a vacuum. One should have started at the base.'[108] According to him, this considerably limits the effectiveness of the cadre as, ultimately, any administrative decision requires the cooperation of the village chiefs.[109] The difficulties in the selection process extend further. According to a member of the Muslim community, the third biggest religion in the Congo, their faith organization has not yet been approached by the consortium.[110] A civil society representative in Numbi also complains that the selection process has marginalized the communities of the *Hauts Plateaux* because it was dominated by those from Buzi's coastline, who voted for their own, reflecting some of the historical fault lines in Buhavu and Buzi.[111] She continues to say that while there is somewhat of a rapprochement at the moment, the cadre and the other civil society umbrella organizations each continue to pursue their own activities.[112]

Others go further and accuse the cadre of not doing the work it is supposed to do. One member of civil society says that to his knowledge, the cadre neither coordinates among

---

106   Interviews with civil society and cadre members, Kalehe-centre, 5 and 6 July 2019.

107   Interview with member of civil society, Minova, 10 July 2019.

108   Interview with member of civil society, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.

109   Interview with member of civil society, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.

110   Interview with member of Muslim community, Minova, 10 July 2019.

111   Interview with member of civil society, Numbi, 11 July 2019.

112   Interview with member of civil society, Numbi, 11 July 2019. This observation is reinforced in an interview with a police officer, Minova, 9 July 2019.

its different constituents nor does it report back to communities.[113] While civil society does not have a single voice, the cadre pretends it does (on the grounds that it is fully inclusive) and ARC buys in to this view. A civil society colleague also adds that the cadre is only active when its activities are financed by ARC; without its support, little happens.[114] Another points to the unsustainability of this approach: 'What VNGi does is good but once they leave, we return to zero. We only meet when VNGi is there.'[115] Herein lies a crucial challenge. Similar to civil servants, those who work for civil society organizations do not have a permanent salary. They live off the activities those organizations implement, which are predominantly funded by international organizations. Being a partner in or affiliated to such projects is thus also a matter of livelihood. To ensure relations with international partners requires constant positioning and investment in public relations. Stakes are high and competition fierce. It is, then, common for those who miss out on this or that project to boycott its activities or speak badly about it, and vice versa. For example, a member of a civil society umbrella organization mentions that they hold weekly meetings, bringing together the major civil society groups, but the ARC cadre does not show up; first, they ask who has organized the meeting, he says, and if it is not one of the ARC consortium international NGOs, they are not interested.[116]

Civil society associations and their leaders have become very good at positioning themselves in a variety of networks in order to tap as many of these international financial flows as possible. It thus happens that individuals occupy several roles in the same project or across rival organizations. An interviewee indicates, for example, that a key cadre member was also the full-time adviser on matters of agriculture for the consortium. Several cadre members are also members of the traditional civil society umbrella organizations at *groupement* level.[117] While this recycling of personnel can have advantages in mobilizing across interest groups, it also makes individual figures extremely influential and can lead to serious conflicts of interest, especially when they pursue their own political agendas.

Finally, the fact that the cadre is a fabrication by outsiders considerably limits its impact. As one of its members says, 'Someone had to put us together.'[118] The cadre only exists in Kalehe, where ARC is active, but ARC does not maintain similarly far-reaching networks as other civil society structures do at the provincial and national level. As a member of a longer-standing umbrella organization puts it: 'We do it the traditional way. When I write

113   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019; regular conversations with staff of international NGO, June, July and November 2019.

114   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019; interview with member of youth association, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.

115   Interview with member of civil society, Minova, 10 July 2019. The cadre was formed by ZOA and not VNGi. Its representatives, however, participate in several of consortium activities regardless of which consortium member leads them.

116   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019; interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.

117   Interview with member of youth association, Kalehe-centr, 5 July 2019.

118   Interview with member of cadre, Kalehe-centre, 6 July 2019.

a report, I send it to Bukavu. He [the cadre member], when he writes a report, where does he send it to? Is our province aware of the cadre? It has to be done in a formal way, and not informally.'[119] Although the cadre is the only civil society presence invited to ARC security-related activities, it is not involved in much longer established security meetings, such as the CLS or CLSe. The same representative says that it is their civil society, which is updated about or sometimes invited to meetings at the level of the territory, sector and *groupement*.[120] Cadre representatives may thus miss out on crucial information and decision-making processes around local security. Worse, the lack of cadre roots in local communities and the personal ambitions of its members also result in a failure to do what is arguably their most important job: Relaying information back to the people.

Due to the interests at stake—the financial gains and political positioning to be made through association with an international consortium—in a short time, the cadre has turned from an intended loose and community-rooted network into a full-fledged structure with a clear hierarchy. It has become yet another layer of civil society claiming to be an umbrella organization but does little to sensitize the communities it is meant to represent, hampering the work of VNGi on local security governance. The situation is not completely bleak, however. In addition to its work on the CLSP and FGs, VNGi has also been engaging on governance around local development through the *budget participatif* (participatory budget), which seems to have borne some fruit. Its initial achievements may indicate avenues for that budget to also play a role in local security.

The *budget participatif*

The participatory budget allows local citizens to shape a part of their local administration budget and help determine investment projects in their communities, according to their own priorities. Invented and trialled for the first time in Porto Alegre in Brazil in 1989, the idea was quickly picked up by major financial and development institutions and applied across the world.[121] In the Congo, the participatory budget piloted in the province of South Kivu in 2011, with support from the World Bank. One year later, a provincial decree institutionalized it in the public finances of the ETDs. Since 2017, ARC has supported the implementation of that decree into practice in the chieftaincy of Buhavu.

The Buhavu participatory budget is largely dedicated to socio-economic development and is not meant to cover matters of local security. In late 2018, for example, the council of the participatory budget, the *Conseil Local de Développement* (CLD, Local Development Council), made up of the seven *groupement* chiefs, civil society organizations, and representatives from women, youth, faith and business groups in Buhavu, agreed on a list of nine development projects. These included water and environment projects, the expan-

119   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.

120   Interview with member of civil society, Kalehe-centre, 5 July 2019.

121   Osmany Porto de Oliveira, 'La diffusion globale du budget participatif : le rôle des "ambassadeurs" de la participation et des institutions internationals', *Participations* 1/14 (2016): 91–120.

sion of a school, road construction and rehabilitation, and the construction of an office for one of the *groupement* chiefs (by far the most expensive investment). The participatory budget amounts to a total of USD 142,000, of which Buhavu covers USD 42,000 or approximately 30 per cent. The rest is to be financed by its international partners.[122]

Some have welcomed the budget as it has brought more transparency in the management of chieftaincy finances. A member of civil society admits that previously, 'There was no way to separate the chieftaincy from the *mwami*.'[123] A colleague agrees: 'In any case, the VNGi has brought what did not exist before in to the culture of our chiefs and the people from the chieftaincy.'[124] At the same time, however, she retained a degree of scepticism as to the capacity and willingness of the chieftaincy to implement these projects. So far, she says, they have never seen any results from their taxes, which have gone to the chieftaincy.

In theory, the mechanism of the participatory budget could also be used to contribute to the funding of projects with a direct link to matters of local security. The police, however, maintain doubts due to the chieftaincy track record in supporting security. As one police officer explains, 'So, the participatory budget… What customary chief can accept to give money to the police while he knows that this is his share and nobody can come and bother him?'[125] Nevertheless, once the *mwami* acknowledge their role in local security, the participatory budget could create new avenues for change. Pressure from international partners and civil society could make a real difference here.

It is clear that outside interventions face several important challenges when engaging with existing security governance structures. The participatory budget mechanism shows, however, that some investment projects—as modest as they may be—are funded by the chieftaincy and could also be turned towards matters of local security. This would require effective lobbying to be successful.

122   Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 'Procès verbal portant les projets d'investissements retenus dans le cadre du budget participatif par la Chefferie de Buhavu pour l'exercice 2019', Buhavu: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 16 November 2018; Chieftaincy of Buhavu, 'Plan annuel d'investissement de la Chefferie de Buhavu exercice 2019', Buhavu: Chieftaincy of Buhavu, March 2019 (on file with author).

123   Interview with member of civil society, Kalungu, 8 July 2019.

124   Interview with member of civil society, Minova, 10 July 2019.

125   Participant in focus group with police officers, Minova, 8 July 2019.

6. Conclusion and policy considerations

Security governance in Kalehe, and the Congo as a whole, is marked by a long history of scarcity, coercion and fragmentation. It is also characterized by a plurality of actors constantly negotiating precarious and fleeting arrangements to cope with the worst forms of insecurity. Moreover, security governance is steeped in larger logics of patronage, which turn security and its institutions into lucrative sources of revenue, competed over by state and non-state actors. While it may be difficult for outside international NGO interventions to break these fundamental logics, it is nevertheless important to understand what is at stake to avoid projects that fuel competition over resources.

Decentralization and police reform disrupt existing security governance arrangements. The former has led chiefs of newly decentralized entities to mimic long-standing state practices of resource extraction without providing any services in return. In Kalehe and the chieftaincy of Buhavu, decentralization has led to a tug-of-war between administrative authorities. Those with the means to invest in security are not in the habit, nor have the clout to do so; and those who deal with security and do have the required experience, lack the funds for it. If this fundamental dilemma is not addressed, outside interventions risk being reduced to additional variables for local actors to circumvent, co-opt, manipulate or undermine according to their own interests.

The core objective of police reform—and reform of the security sector as a whole—is to promote a fundamental shift in security logics from the state to the human being. This requires a major overhaul of security governance, which is a generational undertaking because it threatens to undermine the very foundations of power of those responsible for implementing the reform. For outsiders, supporting such a reform requires open eyes and an iron will to persevere despite setbacks. Engagement demands a comprehensive, profound and enduring commitment, a considerable budget and much expertise on the local context and its complex dynamics.

Congolese president Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo and South Kivu governor Théo Ngwabije Kasi have both reaffirmed their support for police reform. Despite the challenges, donors and international NGOs should aim to keep them to their word and support their plans. To do so within existing budgetary and time constraints, five considerations may be worth exploring further: Thinking human security; engaging the police; using the CLSP and FGs to their full potential; budgeting for security; and mobilizing the chieftaincy.

Thinking human security

Security should not be reduced to the protection of national and state interests, such as the fight against armed groups. Rather, it has a fundamental human dimension directly linked to the everyday needs of the population. Human security fosters thought about concrete chal-

lenges and collectively finding practical solutions that can improve the lived experience of Congolese citizens. Such solutions do not always require significant means; neither are they linked by default to state security actors and nor do they need to be initiated from above. Setting up a suggestion letterbox in front of a police station to anonymously provide tips to the police or installing public lighting at a market place are only two relatively cost-effective examples with real life impact. The sooner that those concerned with security governance start thinking in terms of human security, the more likely that their proposals and actions will align with the principle of putting community security needs at the heart of their initiatives. Thinking human security is thus a first and fundamental step, which underlies the following more practice-oriented suggestions.

Engaging the police

For outside interventions in local security governance, it is of primary importance to directly engage with and involve the police. While initial reluctance may be understandable due to the human rights track record of the PNC, not doing so is counterproductive. After all, the CLSP and FG are the direct result of police reform and function as the key instrument in improving police–community relations. Convincing ETD chiefs and civil society of the purpose of the CLSP and FGs is therefore as important as ensuring PNC buy-in. This means that interventions should have a similar budget at their disposal for activities aimed at the police as for those aimed at chiefs and civil society. Providing human rights and basic legal training, supporting logistics and facilitating police–community activities such as those conducted by Search for Common Ground should all be considered.

Using the CLSP and FGs to their full potential

The CLSP and FGs offer a significant opportunity to lay the groundwork for more accountability and increased proximity between security actors, local administrations and local communities. Using them to their full potential is therefore important. As the example of Buhavu shows, however, this does not yet seem to be the case. In part, this is due to the challenges of logistics and financing and the lack of will to invest time and energy into them. It is also due to a misunderstanding of their purpose. At least in terms of the latter, outside interventions should be able to help. First and foremost, the CLSP does not replace but rather complements the CLS. The CLSP builds on the decentralized ETD budget and the CLSP fund, which allows local authorities and communities to coordinate, plan and seek co-funding for and intervene in matters of human security on their own. The CLS, in the meantime, deals with matters of state security, such as the fight against armed groups, and continues to take operational decisions that can also be in support of CLSP plans.

The experience of past police reform support programmes shows that legal texts best follow what works in practice, and not vice versa. For local administrators, donors and implementers, the golden rule to maximize the CLSP and FGs should therefore be to consider their legal texts as guiding instruments with the flexibility to bend to local exigencies of the moment. They should be tools to facilitate governance in adverse climates and to empower the administrator who

has to face them. In sum, the spirit of the law—communication and inclusion—should prevail over its letter. Most importantly, its letter should not become an excuse to avoid engagement.

While the CLSP decree provides flexibility for practical adaptation, *groupement* chiefs should take the leeway necessary to adapt the chieftaincy and territory decisions on the FG to their own local security needs. The efforts of the chieftaincy and international partners should ultimately be geared towards promoting communication and inclusion on matters of local security between all parties—to keep everyone engaged and talking. The everyday security practices of some local administrators, such as post and village chiefs, may serve as an inspiration as to how to govern security in conditions as challenging as those in Kalehe. Finally, lessons can be learned from the cities and municipalities where police reform was piloted and where the CLSPs and FQs are still functioning in late 2019. Mobilizing the existing expertise from the many Congolese specialists, who were and continue to be involved in their implementation, could be a valuable exercise for any new outside intervention in security governance.

Budgeting for security

Despite stark budgetary shortfalls on all fronts, there is nonetheless some leeway in existing budgets to mobilize more funds for local security projects. On the one hand, the *Fonds secret de recherche* (FRS) give ETD chiefs a considerable budget for security-related expenses, along with much discretion on how to use it. While the FSR seems to fund some ad hoc expenses related to organizing CLS meetings, it should be able to go beyond this and also invest in local projects conducive to decreasing perceived and actual insecurity. For the FSR to be sufficiently endowed, international partners could support strengthening the chieftaincy tax collection capacity. Donors could also lobby the finance ministry and the ministry for budgeting to break down the FSR further to include budget items explicitly dedicated to security-oriented community projects. In this case, it is important to remember that these same ministries are not immune to the logics of patronage; lobbying would thus have to take into account the clientelist practices they themselves may engage in.[126]

On the other hand, the donor supported participatory budget has shown some successes since its launch in South Kivu. While its funds have been dedicated to socio-economic development projects, nothing excludes the possibility of earmarking one or two projects per year for more security-oriented initiatives. Taking human security and preventative policing as their cornerstones, such initiatives can still have an important developmental dimension: Digging water wells closer to villages, erecting public lighting around markets, rehabilitating roads such as that between Kalungu and Numbi, or providing meals for police on night patrol are all sensible investments with a direct impact on citizen and police livelihoods and should be able to be funded by the FSR or the participatory budget, or a combination of both.

Article 15 of the CLSP decree also envisions setting up a provincial fund to finance its own projects emanating from local security plans. This fund, which gives donors the option to contribute

---

126   Stylianos Moshonas, 'The politics of civil service reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52 (2014): 251–276.

directly to it, would open up a third avenue for mobilizing financial means for local security. It does, however, require to be set up through a provincial by-law passed by the governor. According to the provincial minister of interior, a draft by-law is currently on the desk of the governor.[127] Civil society, partners and donors should continue lobbying for its signature and subsequent implementation. The availability of adequate financing is not sufficient, however, there must also be the will to spend funds on security.

Mobilizing the chieftaincy

The most difficult consideration is how to effectively encourage customary chiefs to take a more active role in the security of their local populations. Identifying an existing role model in the Congo who can inspire others could be an option. The Congo is not the only country in this region of Africa in which customary chiefs still play an important role. Drawing on the experiences of elders in neighbouring countries in matters of security provision may similarly convince some *bwami* to become more engaged. Remarkable efforts are already underway at the *groupement* level; for example, ARC has invited some chiefs to join workshops in neighbouring countries and to meet their counterparts there to share experiences and exchange lessons. Convincing the *mwami* to participate in such workshops could be a major step forward.

In parallel, it is as important to move towards more conducive working relations between the ETD chiefs and the decentralized authorities. As long as they are seen as a genuine broker, outside interveners should be able to help create the necessary climate for such encounters at little cost. The better these relations, the easier it will be to work together on budgets and projects, and to complement efforts on both sides in improving local security. The oft repeated phrase of police reform—security is everyone's business—ultimately holds true. This should encourage various local authorities to work together to overcome obstacles.

In the end, where does this leave the question of the applicability of the CLSP decree in a rural context? In short, to quote a police officer, 'Security governance depends on those who have to apply it.'[128] In this sense, nothing prevents the CLSP decree from being applied per se—it comes down to the will of those who are meant to enact it. For outside interventions, it is important to build on existing practice and legal frameworks. The human security-oriented CLSP and FQs exist not only in national law and in territorial and ETD decisions but also in urban practice— and in their spirit in rural practice at the lowest administrative level. The state security-centred CLS is a long-standing and nationwide convention that complements the CLSP by tackling those security risks the latter is ill-suited to address. Outside interventions should thus limit time and resources invested in advocating for amendments to existing law or in drafting new legislation. They should certainly not aim to go against the letter of these laws but rather help enable the spirit of the law to take hold by preparing the ground on which these laws stand.

127   Provincial minister of interior of South Kivu, speech delivered during a workshop in Bukavu, 27 November 2019.
128   Interview with police officer, Minova, 6 July 2019.

Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases

ARC	Addressing Root Causes; consortium of three Dutch international NGOs—ZOA, War Child Holland and VNG International
Article 15	refers to practices of improvisation and fending for oneself; the phrase originates in an imaginary article of the 1960 constitution of secessionist South Kasai that encourages its officials to improvise in times of need
AT	*administrateur territorial*, territorial administrator
budget participatif	participatory budget
cadre de concertation	coordination cadre
chefferie	chieftaincy, decentralized administrative entity located below the territory and above the *groupement* (grouping); they are headed by a traditional chief or *mwami* (customary chief), a hereditary position
CLS	*Conseil local de sécurité*, Local Security Council
CLSe	*Conseil local de sécurité élargi*, extended Local Security Council
CLSP	*Conseil local pour la sécurité de proximité*, Local Council for Proximity Security
débrouillez-vous	fend for yourselves, also referred to as '*Système D*'
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ETD	*entités territoriales décentralisées*, decentralized territorial entities
entités territoriales déconcentrées	deconcentrated territorial entities, which, as opposed to the relatively autonomous ETDs (see above), remain executive bodies of the central administration and its policies, financially dependent on the latter and without legal personality of their own

FARDC	*Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo*, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FG	*Forum de groupement*, Grouping Forum
FP	*Force publique*, Public Force
FQ	*Forum de quartier*, Neighbourhood Forum
FSR	*Fonds secrets de recherche*, Secret Research Fund
groupement	grouping
mwami	customary chief
PAS	*Plan d'action de sécurité*, Security Action Plan
PLS	*Plan local de sécurité*, Local Security Plan
PNC	*Police Nationale Congolaise*, Congolese National Police
secteur	sector, decentralized administrative entity located below the territory and above the *groupement*; sectors are headed by a locally elected *chef de secteur* (sector chief)
SSAPR	Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform; DFID-funded programme, running from 2009 to 2015 and supporting police reform in the DRC
STAREC	Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC
Sûreté	Security, name of the Belgian colonial intelligence agency

Bibliography

Ansorg, Nadine, Felix Haass and Julia Strasheim. 'Police reforms in peace agreements, 1975–2011: Introducing the PRPA dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 53/4 (2016): 597–607.

Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC). 'Conflits fonciers et dynamiques de cohabitation en territoire de Kalehe. Sud-Kivu, est de la RDC'. Bukavu: Life & Peace Institute, 2012.

—. 'Analayse de context du territoire de Kalehe'. Bukavu: Life and Peace Institute, 2009.

Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Judith Verweijen, 'Arbiters with guns: the ambiguity of military involvement in civilian disputes in the DR Congo', *Third World Quarterly* 35/5 (2014): 803–820.

Bangura, Ibrahim. 'Democratically Transformed or Business as Usual: The Sierra Leone Police and Democratic Policing in Sierra Leone'. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 7/1 (2018): 1–11;

Biddle, Keith, 'Interview with Keith Biddle'. Innovations for Successful Societies, Oral History Programme, Princeton: Princeton University, 2007.

Chieftaincy of Buhavu. 'Plan de développement local de la Chefferie de Buhavu 2019–2023'. March 2019 (on file with author).

—. '*Plan annuel d'investissement de la Chefferie de Buhavu exercice 2019'.* March 2019 (on file with author).

—. 'Budgetary decision Nr. 33 from 31 December 2018 for the 2019 exercise'. Kalehe, December 2018 (on file with author).

—. 'Procès verbal portant les projets d'investissements retenus dans le cadre du budget participatif par la Chefferie de Buhavu pour l'exercice 2019'. 16 November 2018 (on file with author).

—. 'Décision nr. 001 portant institutionalisation des forums des groupements dans les sept groupements de la chefferie de Buhavu'. 28 March 2019 (on file with author).

Bureau Conjoint des Nations Unies aux Droits de l'Homme. 'Rapport du Bureau conjoint des Nations Unies aux Droits de l'Homme sur les violations des droits de l'homme commises par des agents de la Police Nationale Congolaise dans le cadre de l'opération 'Likofi' à Kinshasa entre le 15 novembre 2013 et le 15 février 2014'. Kinshasa: MONUSCO, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/LikofiReportOctober2014_fr.pdf. Last accessed: 4 October 2019.

Büscher, Karen. 'Conflict, state failure and urban transformation in the Eastern Congolese periphery'. PhD thesis, Ghent: Ghent University, 2011.

Bizhan, Nematullah. 'Building legitimacy and state capacity in protracted fragility: The case of Afghanistan'. London and Oxford: Commission on State Fragility,

Growth and Development, 2018. <https://www.theigc.org/publication/building-legitimacy-state-capacity-protracted-fragility-case-afghanistan>. Last accessed: 4 October 2019.

Callaghy, Thomas M. *The State–Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Columbia Universiy Press, 1984.

Cellule Technique d'Appui à la Décentralisation. 'La décentralisation en bref'. 2013

De Herdt, Tom and Kristof Titeca. 'Governance with Empty Pockets: The Education Sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. *Development and Change* 47/3 (2016): 472–494.

Englebert, Pierre. 'Incertitude, autonomie et parasitisme : Les Entités Territoriales décentralisées et l'État en République démocratique du Congo'. *Politique Africaine* 125 (2012): 169–187.

— and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo. 'Misguided and Misdiagnosed: The Failure of Decentralization Reforms in the DR Cong'. *African Studies Review* 59/1 (2016): 5–32.

Greener, Beth K. 'UNPOL: UN police as peacekeepers'. *Policing & Society* 19 (2009): 109–118.

Grouping of Buzi.' Rapport du forum de groupement de Buzi organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité'. Draft, no date. (on file with author).

Grouping of Mbinga-Nord. 'Rapport du forum de groupement de Mbinga-Nord organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité'. April 2018 (on file with author).

Grouping of Mbinga-Sud. 'Rapport du forum de groupement de Mbinga-Sud organisé dans le cadre du diagnostic local et participative de sécurité'. April 2018 (on file with author).

Hengelela Cihunda, Joseph. 'Decentralised Territorial Entities and Promotion of Local Governance under the Constitution of 18 February 2006 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. In *Decentralisation and Constitutionalism in Africa. E*dited by Charles M. Fombad and Nico Steytler. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019: 365–383.

Henriet, Benoit. 'Ordering the Wetlands: Policing and Legitimate Violence in the Leverville Concession (Belgian Congo, 1911–1920)', In: Emmanuel Blanchard, Marieke Bloembergen and Amandine Lauro (eds.), *Policing in Colonial Empires: Cases, Connections, Boundaries (ca. 1850–1970),* Berlin: Peter Lang, 2017.

Hoffman, Kasper and Koen Vlassenroot. 'Armed groups and the exercise of public authority: the cases of the Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu'. *Peacebuilding* 2/2 (2014): 202–220.

—. 'Ethnogovernmentality: The Making of Ethnic Territories and Subjects in Eastern Congo'. PhD thesis. Copenhagen: Roskilde University, 2014.

—, Koen Vlassenroot and Gauthier Marchais. 'Taxation, stateness and armed groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction in Eastern Congo'. *Development and Change* 47/6 (2016): 1434–1456

Hopkins, Steve. 'More than £50million of British foreign aid was given to police in Congo despite reports they executed nine people including a child'. *Daily Mail,* 28 November 2014. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2853105/More-50million-British-foreign-aid-given-police-Congo-despite-reports-executed-nine-people-including-child.html. Last accessed: 4 October 2019.

Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo. 'Loi n° 11/011 du 13 juillet 2011 relative aux finances publiques'. 52nd year, special number, 25 July 2011.

—. 'Loi organique n° 10/11 du 18 mai 2010 portant fixation des subdivisions territoriales à l'intérieur des provinces'. Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la République, 7 June 2010.

—. 'Loi organique n° 08/016 du 7 octobre 2008 portant composition, organisation et fonctionnement des Entités Décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l'État et les Provinces', Kinshasa: Cabinet du Président de la République, 10 October 2008.

—. 'Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo'. 47th year, special number, 18 February 2006.

Kaumba Lufunda. 'La formation d'une armée républicaine et d'une police nationale: situation et perspectives'. *Congo–Afrique* 470 (2012): 726–751.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis'. *Social Text*, 60 (1999): 53–62.

Mathys, Gillian. 'People on the move: Frontiers, borders, mobility and history in the Lake Kivu region, 19th to 20th century'. PhD thesis. Ghent: Ghent University, 2014: 130–136.

Ministry of Budget. 'Commentaires sur les états de suivi budgétaire à fin juin 2018 (situation provisoire).' 9 July 2018. https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/documents/comments-on-the-monitoring-statements-budget-at-the-end-of-june-2018. Last accessed: 4 October 2019.

MONUSCO Stabilization Support Unit. 'International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, 2013–2017'. 2013.

Moshonas, Styliano. 'The politics of civil service reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52 (2014): 251–276 .

Mudinga Mushagalusa, Emery. 'Les conflits fonciers à l'Est de la RDC: au-delà de la confrontation entre rwandophones et autochtones à Kalehe'. In *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2012–2013*. Edited by Filip Reyntjens, Stefan Vandeginste and Marije Verpoorten. Paris: Harmattan, 2013: 195–218.

Newbury, Catherine. 'Ebutumwa Bw'emiogo: The Tyranny of Cassava. A Women's Tax Revolt in Eastern Zaire'. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18/1 (1984): 35–54.

Nlandu, Thierry Mayamba .'Mapping Police Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Institutional Interactions at Central, Provincial and Local Levels'. IDS Research Report 71. London: Institute of Development Studies, 2012

No author. 'Nomenclature budgétaire de la République Démocratique du Congo. Nomenclature des dépenses'. Édition 2015 (extract on file with author).

—. 'Guide Pratique: Les Comités Provinciaux et locaux de sécurité et les Forums de Quartier'. Kinshasa, 27 February 2012 (on file with author).

Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila. A People's History.* London: Zed Books, 2002.

Oxfam. 'In the Balance: Searching for Protection in eastern DRC'. Oxfam Briefing Paper 179, 27 January 2014. https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/media/files/bp-in-the-balance-protection-eastern-drc-270114-en.pdf. Last accessed: 4 October 2019.

Palladium. 'Independent Evaluation of the Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform Programme: Final Evaluation Report'. London: Palladium, 2015.

Paddon, Emily and Guillaume Lacaille. 'Stabilising the Congo', Forced Migration Policy Briefing 9, Oxford: University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 2011.

Porto de Oliveira, Osmany. 'La diffusion globale du budget participatif : le rôle des « ambassadeurs » de la participation et des institutions internationals'. *Participations* 1/14 (2016), 91–120.

President's Office, 'Loi organique nr. 11/013 du 11 août 2011 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Police Nationale Congolaise', Kinshasa, 2011 (on file with author).

Prime Minister's Office. 'Programme du Gouvernement'. August 2019, Kinshasa: Prime Minister's Office, 2019 (on file with author).

Prime Minister's Office. 'Décret Nr. 13/041 du 16 septembre 2013 portant creation, organisation et fonctionnement des Conseils Locaux pour la Sécurité de Proximité', Kinshasa: Prime Minister's Office, 2013 (on file with author).

Provincial Governor's Office (South Kivu). 'Discours-Programme du Gouvernement Provincial prononcé par Son Excellence Monsieur Théo Ngwabidje Kasi, Gouverneur de Province, à l'Assemblée Provinciale du Sud-Kivu'. 11 June 2019, Bukavu (on file with author).

Rift Valley Institute. 'Stabilization in Eastern and Central Africa: Insights from Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC'. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2014.

Roes, Aldwin. 'Towards a History of Mass Violence in the Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885–1908'. *South African Historical Journal* 62/4 (2010): 634–670.

Rotmann, Philipp. 'First steps towards a police doctrine for UN peace operations (2001–2006)'. *Policing and Society* 21/1 (2011): 84–95.

Synergie des associations des jeunes pour l'éducation civique et électorale et la promotion des droits de l'homme au Sud-Kivu-Forces Vives. 'Sud-Kivu 2018: 345 personnes tuées, 881maisons attaquées par des bandits armés, 232 cas d'enlèvement et 36 cas de justice populaire en une seule année'. *SAJECEK Bulletin* 60 (23 January 2019).

Schatzberg, Michael G. *The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Schermuly, Allegra Clare. 'Encounters between the police and the public: seize the day or practice avoidance?'. *Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice* 4/2 (2018): 148–160.

Search for Common Ground (SFCG). 'Final Evaluation: Phase IV of Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika'. November 2018.

Territory of Kalehe. 'Plan d'action de sécurité: Territoire de Kalehe'. January 2019 (on file with author).

—. 'Décision nr. 5072/012/531/BUR-AT/KLH/2018 du 04/06/2018 portant institutionalization des forums des groupements dans le territoire de Kalehe'. 4 June 2018 (on file with author).

Thill Michel. 'Police at Work in Bukavu: Negotiating Revenue-generation in Urban Pirate Markets'. In *Negotiating Public Services in the Congo: State, Society and Governance.* Edited by Tom De Herdt and Kristof Titeca. London: Zed Books, 2019.

Thill, Michel, Robert Njangala and Josaphat Musamba. 'Putting everyday police life at the centre of reform'. Policy briefing, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2018

Vansina, Jan. 'A Comparison of African Kingdoms'. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 32/4 (1962): 324–335.

Verweijen, Judith. 'Violent Cities, Violent Society: Analyzing urban violence in the eastern Congo'. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2019.

—. 'Stable Instability: Political settlements and armed groups in the Congo', London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016.

—. 'Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus', *Review of African Political Economy* 40/135 (2013): 67–82.

— and Claude Iguma. 'Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo'. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2015.

Vlassenroot, Koen, Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga and Kasper Hoffmann. 'Contesting Authority: Armed rebellion and military fragmentation in Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu'. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016.

Vogel, Christoph and Josaphat Musamba. 'Recycling Rebels? Demobilization in the Congo'. London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016.

Young, Crawford and Thomas Turner. *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State.* London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.